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9.a. Public & Institutional Zoning District Text Amendment, Case 10-13-TA
4 ROSEMOUNT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CITY COUNCIL City Council Meeting: April 17, 2012 AGENDA ITEM: 10 -13 -TA Public & Institutional AGENDA SECTION: Zoning District Text Amendment New Puu 1 V26`3S PREPARED BY: Jason Lindahl, A.I.C.P. AGENDA NOffi� Planner vl ATTACHMENTS: Excerpt Minutes from the 3/27/12 PC, APPROVED BY: 2/28/12 PC, and 1/11/12 CC Work Session and 12 -27 -11 PC Work Session, Ordinance Revising and Updating the P/I District, Ordinance Revising and Updating the Residential Sections of the City Code, Resolution Authorizing Publication, Ordinance Revising and Updating the Sign Section of the City Code, Resolution Re- Guiding Selected Public and Institutional Properties, Ordinance Rezoning Selected Public and Institutional Uses, Supreme Court A05 -1074, Real Estate Journal Article dated June 2008, Comments from the City Attorney, Stakeholders Contact List, Draft Zoning Map,Draft 2030 Comprehensive Plan Map, RECOMMENDED ACTION: Staff recommends the City Council makes the following motions: 1. Motion to adopt an ordinance (zoning text amendment) revising and updating Section 11 -4 -18, the P/I — Public and Institutional District relating to uses and performance standards. 2. Motion to adopt an ordinance (zoning text amendment) revising and updating the Residential sections of the City Code relating performance standards for public an • institutional uses. 3. Motion to adopt a resolution authorizing publication of ordinance no. B -219 amending the City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B Relating to the Public and Institutional District and Ordinance B -220 amending the City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B relating to the Residential districts 4. Motion to adopt an ordinance revising and updating the Sign Ordinance section of the City Code relating sign standards for public and institutional uses. 5. Motion to adopt a resolution re- guiding selected public and institutional properties to the appropriate land use category as detailed in the attach draft resolution, subject to approval by the Metropolitan Council. 6. Motion to adopt an ordinance rezoning selected public and institutional uses from P/1 — Public Institutional to the appropriate zoning category as detailed in the attached draft ordinance. SUMMARY Staff recommends approval of a series of zoning text amendments, land use changes and rezonings related to public and institutional uses. As per the previous Planning Commission discussion, the application previously included a recommendation to rezone public parks from public institutional to residential which has been withdrawn. The items before the Council do not modify zoning or performance standards associated with parks in the public institutional zoning district. The remaining items were initiated by staff to implement the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, provide consistency in the zoning standards for public and institutional uses and limit the City's exposure to potential litigation. This memo details the rationale for the recommended changes, recaps staffs work with the Planning Commission on this issue, summarizes staff's meetings with stakeholders, and details the proposed changes. Should the City approve the recommended action, the following changes would occur: 1. Establish a detailed list of permitted, accessory, conditional and interim uses for the P/I — Public and Institutional District focusing on public facilities (i.e. Dakota County Technical College, Rosemount High School, the Community Center and public parks). 2. Establish one city wide zoning practice for more traditional public and institutional uses tY gp p (churches and elementary or middle schools) by rezoning those uses currently zoned Public and Institutional to a Residential classification consistent with existing City policy. 3. Establish new development standards and site and building criteria for non -park public and institutional uses. PREVIOUS PLANNING COMMISSION ACTION The Planning Commission recommended approval of this item at the March 27 meeting. During that meeting, the Commission continued the public hearing opened on February 28 Staff reminded the Commission that this item no longer included a rezoning for public parks. The continued public hearing included public comments confirming that rezoning public parks was no longer part of the proposal and questions about the need to make any changes to the Public and Institutional district. The City Attorney reviewed reasons for the recommended changes and clarified that the recommendations were not related to a desire for future ease in condemning land, as mentioned by one resident. The Attorney noted the benefits to the private property owners and neighborhood with the proposed changes. The Commission thanked staff for their work with individual property owners and the public to find a compromise on this issue. The Planning Commission initially opened the public hearing for this item during the February 28t meeting. At that meeting staff presented the formalized proposal and detailed the proposed changes. During the public hearing there was notable opposition to the portion of the proposal that would rezone some public parks from P/I — Public and Institutional to a Residential category. The public comment focused on the idea that rezoning the parks to a residential category would allow further development of the parks to private uses. There was also concern that the rezoning may shift funding and maintenance from the City to private parties such as a homeowners' association. 2 Staff clarified that the portion of the proposal to rezone public parks to a residential zoning category was primarily a procedural change that would eliminate overlapping zoning regulations and bring uniform zoning to all public parks. Ultimately the Planning Commission and staff decided to withdraw the portion of the application that recommended rezoning public parks to a residential category and table the remaining items so staff could amend the documents accordingly. Staff began discussing this item with the Planning Commission in 2010. Those initial meetings focused on potential legal issues relating to allowing reasonable use of property and potential takings issues, the goals and policies of the Comprehensive Plan, and deficiencies with the existing P/I — Public Institutional zoning standards. Those discussions resulted in the Planning Commission directing staff to prepare a zoning text amendment that was consistent with the Comprehensive Plan and reinforced the City's existing practice of locating major public institutional uses (Rosemount High School, Dakota County Technical College, and larger park facilities) in the P/I District while allowing other less substantive public institutional activities (churches, elementary and middle schools) as conditional uses in residential districts. One of the goals of the current application is to move private uses out of the Public Institutional to avoid potential future legal issues should the owner want to convert the property use from the current use. In fact, the staff had explored initially doing away with the P/I District. Totally eliminating the zoning district also had some drawbacks, particularly how to regulate the larger institutional uses, which are one of a kind, and are difficult to write specific standards for specialized activities such as a football stadium or sports dome. After review of the existing public /institutional properties and the improvements already on the properties it became clearer that some institutional zoning was necessary. During the summer of 2011, staff met or had phone conversations with all property owners of churches and schools that would be affected by the proposed changes. During those discussions staff explained the reasoning behind the proposed changes, their potential impact and allowed opportunity for feedback. These uses were primarily churches, which were recommended to be rezoned to residential as a conditional use. Generally the feedback was positive with most questions relating to potential non - conformities (see Discussions with Property Owners & Potential Non - Conformities section below). The property owners appreciated the City offering to discuss the proposed changes prior to the formal public hearing process. Based on discussions with property owners, the Commission and Council staff made additional revisions to the proposed text amendments and brought this item back to the Planning Commission in October and December of 2011 for further review. After some discussion and minor language adjustments, the Commission directed staff to bring the item to the January 2012 City Council work session for review and comment. During that meeting, the City Council directed staff to formalize the proposed zoning text, zoning map and land use map changes as well as directed the Planning Commission to hold an open house and public hearing on this issue. That open house was held the hour prior to the Planning Commission meeting on February 28, 2012. Representatives from St. Joseph's Church and Rosemount Methodist Church attended but only to confirm the proposal contained the information described in their individual meetings with staff. BACKGROUND As mentioned above, this item was initiated by staff to implement the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, provide consistency in the zoning standards for public and institutional uses and limit the City's exposure to potential litigation. In terms for implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, the rule requires that zoning is consistent with the adopted Comprehensive Plan. Further, the Plan noted that 3 some Public /Institutional uses are of a larger scale than the surrounding residential uses. "... care is needed to buffer the conflicts between the uses while maintaining accessibility from the neighborhood. Performance measures such as setbacks, landscaping, site grading, and quality building materials may need to be increased compared to the surrounding uses to provide the needed buffering." Further, the Comprehensive Plan noted that "Institutional uses should be located adjacent to collector or arterial roads." (p73 City of Rosemount 2030 Comprehensive Plan). Some of the ordinance changes proposed are directly linked to the recommendations found in the Plan, such as providing performance standards for the P/I zoning district. Initial work on this process began in 2010. Along with the Comprehensive Plan implementation, in the last few years neighboring Dakota County communities have experienced issues with privately owned land guided or zoned for what would typically be considered a public use. Specifically, Burnsville, Eagan and Mendota Heights all had privately owned golf courses that wanted to redevelop but had limited marketability because of their public /institutional land use or zoning classification (see attached comments from the City Attorney). During the last meeting, many in the public noted that there is only one golf course in Rosemount and therefore the litigation question is not applicable. The point of the court cases is more about public uses of private land. There is the concern that there must be reasonable use available for a property if the owner does not want to continue in the current use. With the current uses in the P/I district there are very few private uses allowed by right or through conditional use. If a church wants to relocate and sell their property, the value of the property in part is based upon the current zoning and what can be allowed on the property. By rezoning to residential, there are more private land use options available than the current condition. While there is no such case at present in Rosemount, staff's job is to monitor land use court cases and their potential impacts. Similar to when a lawsuit modified the criteria for granting variances, staff believes it is in the best interest of the City to address this potential zoning conflict before there is an issue. By way of background, in 2005, the City was faced with a similar dilemma when Dean Johnson requested approvals for a townhouse project that was on land zoned Public and Institutional. Prior to that time the City had identified the property as a potential parcel for acquisition and expansion of Erickson Park. While ultimately the City rezoned the property; the review process pointed out the limitations of the Public Institutional zoning district when the property is in private ownership rather than public. The third reason staff initiated this item was to update the P/I — Public and Institutional zoning districts standards. Currently, the P/I District include three sections: Purpose and Intent, Permitted Use, and Conditional Uses. The proposed text amendment will revise and update the P/I District to include accessory and interim uses as well as development requirements (lot dimensions, setbacks, and structure height) and site and building standards (architecture, building materials, pedestrian circulation, lighting, parking lot, and landscaping). Adding these zoning features will create consistent standards for public and institutional uses. ISSUE ANALYSIS Implementing the proposed changes involves amending the Public and Institutional, Residential and Sign zoning standards as well as changes to both the zoning and land use maps. It is important to note that this proposal no longer includes rezoning of any public park. The proposed changes are detailed in the attached ordinances, resolutions and maps. A summary of the proposed changes to each item is provided below. Proposed Changes to the P/I — Public and Institutional District 1. Assign the following as permitted uses: college or universities; public or governmental services, including, city offices, public administration buildings and the like; public auditoriums, civic 4 centers, community centers or the like; parks owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area; and secondary schools. 2. Create an accessory use category including community gardens, fences, off -street parking, and signs to clarify additional activities allowed in the District. 3. Add an interim use section including temporary classrooms and the like. 4. Add specific development (setback, lot, height) standards. 5. Add specific site and building (architecture, building materials, pedestrian circulation, lighting, parking lot, and landscaping) standards. Proposed Changes to Residential Districts 1. Assign the following as conditional use: golf courses and elementary, special education (i.e. District 917 Alliance Education Center) and middle schools. 2. Both existing and new conditional uses would be subject to the P/I site and building (architectural appearance, building massing, permitted materials, pedestrian circulation, lighting, parking, and landscaping), buffer yards, lot, parking and building height standards. Proposed Changes to the Sign Standards 1. Provide the same sign standards for pubic and institutional uses whether the use is located in a Residential or Public and Institutional zone. Most notably, Dynamic signs may be located at a public and institutional use within a residential zone, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP) and complies with all other sign standards. Proposed Land Use Map Changes In addition to the zoning text changes detailed above most public and institutional uses would also need a comprehensive plan amendment to reflect removal from the Public Institutional designation. (see attached maps). 1. Churches, private parks (such as those in Harmony), elementary and middle schools would be re- guided residential on the City's Future Land Use Map. Proposed Zoning Map Changes These properties should also be rezoned to reflect the residential land use designation for consistency. The goal of this exercise is to move more properties out of the public institutional zoning and land use and into residential districts. 1. Churches, elementary and middle schools would be rezoned from Public and Institutional to Residential as a conditional use permit. 2. City Hall, the Library, the Steeple Center and the former St. Joseph's school site would all be rezoned DT — Downtown to comply with the current DT — Downtown land use classification. 3. The CAP (Community Action Partnership) Agency site at 145t Street West and Biscayne would be rezoned C -1, Convenience Commercial and re- guided NC — Neighborhood Commercial. Rezoning and re- guiding this site for commercial uses within an existing residential neighborhood is acceptable to staff because it would allow continued use of this site as a private non -profit office 5 but existing C -1 standards would prohibit future redevelopment of the site to potentially incompatible uses (auto repair, gas stations, drive - thrus). Future redevelopment would allow another office use on site should the CAP Agency ever relocate. Churches and Schools What may have been missed in the previous discussions is that churches and elementary and secondary educational institutions and facilities are already listed as conditional uses in the residential districts. However, most of those properties are zoned as public institutional which lists "all public and institutional uses, facilities and structures" as permitted uses. Both of these uses, public and institutional uses, are not defined within the zoning ordinance. The action proposed will place all churches and most of the schools into the residential district consistent with the neighborhood it is located in. This will require any further modifications at these properties to comply with standards that the rest of the neighborhood must comply with. Additionally, it will allow future uses at the site consistent with those uses permitted in the neighborhood should the church or school use cease. Discussions with Property Owners & Potential Non - Conformities During staffs meeting with stakeholders, it was explained that the new ordinance standards were designed to minimize non - conformities to the greatest extent possible. Those that are created will be addressed under state law. According to that law, non - conformities can be repaired, replaced, restored, maintained or improved but cannot be expanded without meeting the new standards. Should the City approve the new zoning standards making a non - conformity, those standards would only be applied when the individual property owner chose to make site improvements. Staff analyzed each of the affected sites using the proposed zoning changes to determine resulting non - conformities. The majority of the resulting non - conformities relate to the architectural, pedestrian circulation and parking lot design standards. The balance of the new standards will impact the height or screening of future development but can be adjusted to a given site. Staff's analysis found the most notable non - conformity resulting from the proposed changes will occur at the Rosemount Methodist Church (14770 Canada Avenue). Given this site is located within an existing residential neighborhood it fails to meet the current minimum distance standard to a collector or arterial road. It should be noted that under the state law reference above this issue would not prohibit repair, replacement, restoration, maintenance, improvement or expansion of the existing facility within the churches' existing property. However, it would prohibit any expansion of the property's boundaries or relocation of their access further away (to the south) from a collector or arterial street. This is an unlikely issue as the property abutting the church to the south is a City park. Staff has discussed their findings with a representative from the church and they understand and accept this non - conformity. CONCLUSION Both the Planning Commission and staff recommend approval of a series of zoning text amendments, land use changes and rezonings related to public and institutional uses. This item was initiated by staff to implement the 2030 Comprehensive Plan, provide consistency in the zoning standards for public and institutional uses and limit the City's exposure to potential litigation. Based on comments received during the February public hearing, staff has withdrawn the portion of this item that proposed rezoning public parks from P/I — Public and Institutional to a residential zone. This memo details the rational for the recommended changes, recaps staff's work with the Planning Commission on this issue, summarizes staff's meetings with stakeholders, and details the proposed changes. 6 RECOMMENDATION There are several actions requested of the Council. The first two items are zoning text amendments to the Public and Institutional District and the Residential District. The third item is to allow publication of an abridged version of the text amendments. The next item is modifications to the sign ordinance to allow dynamic signs in the public and institutional district. The following item is to reguide the properties that are being rezoned so that they are consistent with the zoning and finally there is an ordinance to rezone the properties, pictorially changing them on the official zoning map. 7 EXCERPT OF DRAFT MINUTES PLANNING COMMISSION REGULAR MEETING MARCH 27, 2012 5.a. Public and Institutional Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment (10- 13 -TA). Staff initiated text amendment amending sections of the Zoning Ordinance relating to public and institutional uses such as churches and schools. This is a continuation of the public hearing opened at the February 28, 2012, Planning Commission meeting and continued to the March 27, 2012 meeting. Planner Lindahl stated that the rezoning of the parks as previously discussed has been removed from the item and any motion made at this meeting will not affect the current zoning classifications of the city parks. Mr. Lindahl further reviewed the staff report. Commissioner Miller asked staff to more specifically clarify which sections are being rezoned and asked why certain areas are being zoned low density when the surrounding area is not zoned low density such as the library. Mr. Lindahl reviewed on the map the areas in question. The public hearing was re- opened at 6:39p.m. Scott Rogers, 14110 Cobbler Avenue, Shannon Elementary, asked if the zoning classification of the park area around Shannon Park Elementary school will remain the same. Mr. Lindahl replied that the park area will remain as public and institutional, but the school property itself will change to the residential zoning. Kathy Klonecky, 15621 Cornell Trail, stated the proposed change is not consistent with the practices of surrounding cities and asked why the change was needed. She wondered if the City was planning on taking property by eminent domain or possibly building a new high school. She stated the Community Center and DCTC are exempt from regulations regardless of the zoning. She suggested the City incorporate higher performance standards within the public and institutional zoning designation if that is the intent of the proposed change. There were no further public comments. MOTION by DiNella to close the public hearing. Second by Ege. Ayes: 6. Nays: None. Motion approved. Public hearing was closed at 6:50p.m. In response to Ms. Klonecky's questions, City Attorney LeFevere explained the reason to the proposed changes and provided clarification of the benefits of changing the zoning the properties from Public and Institutional. Mr. LeFevere also clarified that the zoning designation does not affect the eminent domain process and churches are not exempt from eminent domain. He further stated that the Community Center is city owned property and the City is subject to its own zoning code as other property owners. Mr. LeFevere stated there are questions about the extent to which cities can regulate state owned facilities such as DCTC and in most cases, the issue is generally negotiated between the parties before needing court involvement. Commissioner Miller asked when the conditional use ermit standards become required of the p q properties being rezoned to residential. Mr. Lindahl stated that properties are grandfathered as non- conforming uses and the new standards would only begin if the landowners wanted to make improvements or expansions to the property. Mr. LeFevere explained the grandfather rule to the Commissioners. Commissioner DiNella stated he lived in Eagan at the time the golf course in question was in court proceedings with the city due to the zoning classification. City Attorney LeFevere and Community Development Director Lindquist gave a clarification of the situation which was the basis for the City's initiation of the zoning changes. Ms. Lindquist clarified that the new proposed ordinance changes the zoning of the all involved properties regardless of the zoning classifications such as R1, R1A, or DT. Mr. Lindahl added that staff has had several discussions with the private property owners and all have agreed to the current proposal. Commissioner Demuth asked for an explanation of Motion #3, changes to the sign ordinance. Mr. Lindahl explained the changes to the sign ordinance. Commissioner Miller asked for assurance that the requirements in the first motion would not hinder handicapped access or standards. Mr. Lindahl stated that ADA requirements would override the City's performance standards. MOTION by Powell to recommend the City Council approve the five following items: 1. The attached draft ordinance revising and updating Section 11 -4 -18, the P/I — Public and Institutional District relating to uses and performance standards; 2. The attached draft ordinance revising and updating the Residential sections of the City Code relating performance standards for public and institutional uses; 3. The attached draft ordinance revising and updating the Sign Ordinance section of the City Code relating sign standards for public and institutional uses; 4. Re- guiding selected public and institutional properties to the appropriate land use category as detailed in the attach draft resolution, subject to approval by the Metropolitan Council; and 5. The attached draft ordinance rezoning selected public and institutional uses from P/I — Public Institutional to the appropriate zoning category as detailed in the attached draft ordinance. Second by Miller. Ayes: 6. Nays: None. Motion approved. Mr. Lindahl stated this item will go before the City Council for approval at their regular meeting on April 17, 2012. EXCERPT OF MINUTES PLANNING COMMISSION REGULAR MEETING FEBRUARY 28, 2012 5.a. Public and Institutional Zoning Ordinance Text Amendment (10- 13 -TA). Planner Mr. Lindahl explained the staff report for the initiated text amendment amending sections of the Zoning Ordinance relating to public and institutional uses such as churches, schools, and parks. He stressed to the audience that the text amendment will not result in any developmental changes to the city parks. Chairperson Powell asked staff the risks involved if the text amendment was not approved at this time. Mr. Lindahl stated the difficulty in determining the level of risk which depends on a number of factors, but staff feels it is important to recognize that if the dynamic exists in other communities, it could exist in Rosemount wherein private properties zoned as Public and Institutional want to change. The public hearing was opened at 6:46p.m. Tim Buckenberger, 13844 Claredowns Way, stated that the threat of litigation given as a reason for the amendment is not sufficiently supported with scenarios where this could happen in Rosemount. Also, he stated that the meetings held in 2011 with property owners is a procedural misstatement because he has never been contacted by the city and he feels highly affected by the change. Mr. Buckenberger asked about the quotes in the staff report of the city attorney and asked if staff was following the advice of the city attorney in this matter. Tom McCarthy, 14037 Dartmouth Path, stated the notice letter was very vague and did not specify which residential zoning designation is involved. Also, he stated that while only residents within a 350 foot area received the notices, more of the public uses the park than that. He also stated that not enough time was given to review the staff report and he feels the property values of homes will go down if the zoning designation of the parks is changed. Steven Mann, 3465 143` Street West, stated he doesn't understand the litigation risk to the city of privately owned properties if the parks are already city property. He feels rezoning the parks will shorten the process to develop the parks as residential. He feels the better solution would be to rezone the privately owned properties but leave the parks. Janet Rohlf, 14190 Cobbler Avenue, asked if the 2030 Comprehensive Plan could be changed in the future to allow the parks to be sold for other development. Dennis Randall, 14034 Clover Lane, commented on the lack of time allowed to review the packet and stated that there should be a zoning classification just for parks. He feels changing the zoning to residential will affect the property values. Wendy Hartley, 2765 134 Street West, stated she called the homeowners' association liaison and they did not know anything about this proposal. She questioned the cost involved to rezone all of the properties. Tony Kaufman, 14233 Cobbler Avenue, stated he felt it was dangerous to draw the conclusion that Rosemount will have the same litigation risks as other communities and recommended the City do more research. He asked what the legal obligation is with respect to changing the Comprehensive Plan and zoning classifications. Don Sinnwell, 3335 145` Street West, stated that people buying property next to a church, park or golf course are aware of the zoning of that property. He feels there would not be any problems to rezoning the property at the time it would change hands and therefore the current proposal is unnecessary at this time and causing undue concern among the residents. Erin Fletcher, 13822 Birmingham Court, lives adjacent to St. Joseph's Church and stated she paid more for her land because it was adjacent to an open space. She is concerned that it would be easier to change the use for the property if the proposed rezoning is approved. Ron Jacobson, 3647 143r Street, lives next to Carroll's Woods and stated that rezoning the woods to residential removes one more layer of protection for the woods. He stated he contacted the DNR who informed him that the DNR would have to give permission for any use other than a park. He requested the Commission to table the issue in light of the interest and comments raised. Deb Kaczmarek, 13094 Danube Lane, also requested the item be tabled stating that there was not adequate time to review a 71 page report filled with legal jargon that is hard to understand for regular people. She feels that attaching a zoning classification to the parks with a term less clear than "public" will be confusing. Jackie Doehling, 14885 Dodd Boulevard, lives next to Twin Puddles Park. She stated she was never notified prior to this meeting as it is referenced in the staff report about meetings with property owners. She questioned why parks cannot remain zoned Public and Institutional and requested the definition of "long term" as referenced in the staff report. Karen Kirkwood, 13210 Downey Trail, Apple Valley, lives near the Evermoor development and the Innisfree park. She stated her concern that even a little bit of residential development on the park property would negatively change the neighborhood considerably. Scott Rogers, 14110 Cobbler Avenue, stated he used to live in Eagan when they had the same situation where the City closed a golf course for residential development. He stated he bought his current property because of the park in the backyard and if the intended use is not residential, then the zoning should be zoned as parks. Duane Smith, 14875 Dodd Boulevard, stated he was not notified of any earlier meetings and feels that since the parks are part of the whole community, the whole community should be notified of this change. He suggested the Commission postpone the matter until all residents are notified and can attend the meeting. Mr. Lindahl clarified at this point that the meetings with property owners mentioned in the staff report were meetings held with the owners of the private properties being rezoned such as the churches and schools, not the owners adjacent to the properties. Brad Johnson, 13950 Dander Court, stated that when a person looks to move to a new city, a major item they research is the green spaces and parks. He asked how this will be done if the parks are the same color on the zoning map as the residential areas. Steven Mann, 3465 143rd Street West, approached the Commission again and stated that it is clear the proposal is not supported by the public and questioned what remained in the process. Kathy Klonecky, 15621 Cornell Trail, suggested the zoning designation for parks should be what some other cities are using as "public open spaces ". She stated she contacted the Metropolitan (Met) Council to ask what they require in this process and the Met Council told her they only review what the city submits and that the city is not held by the MN state law of conformity as referenced in the staff report. With respect to the notice received, she stated that every resident should be notified and the letter was hard to understand. Kathleen Rogers, 14110 Cobbler Avenue, stated her opposition to the proposal and that just because the Commission or city is able to do something, it doesn't mean they should. Chuck Gill, 14270 Cobbler Avenue, stated when he bought his property, he was told the park would be there forever. He stated that he doesn't trust the City when it says the long term intended use of the property will not be affected with the proposed zoning change. Amy Lapree, 14090 Cobbler Avenue, stated she remembers when the issue of paved trails within Carrolls Woods was a public hearing and that none of the public voices were heard at that time. She requested the Commission open the issue up to all city residents and not to make any hasty decisions. Kathleen Tousignant, 3581 143r St W., lives adjacent to Carrolls Woods and stated she sees many steps being eliminated in the process to have the property developed as residential. She told of a time she called the Minnesota Zoo to see if they could retrieve an owl that had been abandoned in Carrolls Woods. The Minnesota Zoo informed her that being in Carrolls Woods, the bird was already in a protected zone. She requested that the park remain a protected zone. Kathy Klonecky, 15621 Cornell Trail, approached again and stated she felt the schools and city hall should remain Public and Institutional zoned properties. There were no further public comments. Mr. Lindahl explained the process of the Planning Commission, the notification of public hearings and publications, and clarified the meetings held with the stakeholders of the owners of the properties actually being rezoned. He stated that the owners of the private properties are in favor of the rezoning. Mr. Lindahl addressed the questions asked in the public comments. He stated the issue with the private properties being publicly zoned is different than rezoning the parks which are already public property. With respect to the notice sent to the residents, Mr. Lindahl stated that City staff followed state law regarding the requirement to notice all residents within 350 feet of the involved property and the purpose of the notice is sometimes hard to explain in a short and concise manner. He stated that amending the comprehensive plan is a different process not part of the current proposal and he acknowledged the suggestion by one resident to zone the parks as a completely separate zoning category as a viable option. Community Development Director Lindquist stated if there is a difference between the zoning designation and the land use designation, the land use would govern. She stated the purpose for the text amendment is to stay in compliance with the 2030 Comprehensive Plan and further clarified the litigation risk as it relates to private property, not the parks. She stated that the parks are not the main purpose of the text amendment and suggests the Commission pull the park rezoning item from the recommendations but continue with the other areas. Further discussion took place on the affect of rezoning of parks and Chairperson Powell stated his opinion that if the parks are rezoned to residential, the city would not be able to reassure those residents that live adjacent to the parks of the longevity of the park. Chairperson Powell made a motion to continue the public hearing so staff and the Commission were allowed time to consider the public comments. MOTION by Powell to continue the public hearing to the March 27, 2012 Planning Commission meeting. Second by Ege. Ayes: 6. Nays: None. Motion approved. Public hearing was continued at 8:03p.m. EXCERPT OF MINUTES CITY COUNCIL WORK SESSION JANUARY 11, 2012 2.D. Public & Institutional Zoning District Text Amendment, 10 -13 —TA Community Development Director Linguist summarized the information provided in the staff report. The City Council was pleased that staff made personal contact with' the property owners. They had no concerns regarding the proposed changes. EXCERPT OF MINUTES PLANNING COMMISSION WORK SESSION DECEMBER 27, 2011 a. Public and Institutional Zoning District. Planner Lindahl stated staff is in the process of drafting a series of zoning ordinance changes related to public and institutional uses. This item was initiated by staff as one in a series of zoning ordinance changes to implement the 2030 Comprehensive Plan. Mr. Lindahl explained in detail the reasons for the recommended changes, provides a summary of the changes and staff's meetings with stakeholders, and provided the following proposed timeline for implementation: Public and Institutional Ordinance Amendment Timeline Date Action Involved Parties January 2012 City Council Work Session Stakeholders & City Council February 2012 Open House and Public Hearing with Planning Stakeholders and PC Commission March Present Final Ordinance Amendment to the City Stakeholders & City Council Council for Action Spring 2012 Comprehensive Plan Amendment Metropolitan Council Commissioner Dinella asked for clarification to paragraph g.1. which references a requirement for 360 degree architecture. Mr. Lindahl explained that the requirement references quality and types of material used on the building where each side of the building must have consistent materials on it. A discussion took place on the standards for secondary schools and cemeteries. Chairperson Powell requested that language on Page 6, under Item 7 be revised to read "turf and plantings" rather than "sod and plantings ". Commissioner Dinella asked how the high school will cope with increased growth in the future. Senior Planner Zweber stated that Eagan's attendance levels are decreasing and Apple Valley is barely maintaining their levels, so the school district has stated they will modify the attendance districts among the four high schools in Eagan, Apple Valley and Rosemount to accommodate the growth in Rosemount. City of Rosemount Ordinance No. B- 219 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE B RELATING TO THE P/I - PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTRICT TEXT AMENDMENT THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT, MINNESOTA, ORDAINS that Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended as follows: Section 1. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -18 is hereby amended as follows: 11 -4 -18: P — PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTRICT A. Purpose and Intent: This district is primarily intended to accommodate major public and institutional uses of a governmental, educational, cultural, and recreational, public service and healthcare nature that serve the entire community. Where available, structures shall be serviced by the public sewer and water systems. B. Uses Permitted By Right: 1. Colleges or universities. 2. ' . : . : : . - . .- .:: -, - - . - . -. .. . e .:, • • •;• Public or governmental services. including. city offices. public administration buildings and the like. 3. Public auditoriums, civic centers. community centers or the like. 4. Public parks owned and operated by a governmental unit. including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 5. Secondary schools. C. Accessory Use: The following uses shall be permitted accessory uses: 1. Community Gardens. 2. Fences as regulated by this title. 3. Off street parking as regulated by this title. 1 4. Signs as regulated by this title. D. Uses Permitted By Conditional Usc Permit (CUP): In accordance with section 11 10 7, "Conditional Use Permits (CUP) ", of this title: Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the P district and are subject to the conditional use permit provisions in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Cemeteries in accordance with the standards of section 11 -10 -10 of this title. 2. Commercial recreation, both indoor and outdoor by agreement or lease with a cpon3oring governmental property owner for a facility that i3 jointly u3cd by private and governmental entities. 3. Inflatable domes, stadiums and structures such as, subject to: a. Domes that are incompatible with residential districts shall be located a minimum of five hundred feet (500') from any residential district or use. (Ord. B, 9 -19 -1989; amd. Ord. B -130, 6 -17 -2003) 4. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. E. Interim Uses: 1. Temporary classroom type structure for use by public or private institutions for up to a three (3) year term. 2. Other uses similar to those listed in Section E as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. F. Minimum Lot Requirements And Setbacks: 1. Maximum lot coverage: Seventy percent (70 %). 2. Minimum front yard setback: Thirty feet (30'). 3. Minimum side yard setback: Thirty feet (30'). 4. Minimum rear yard setback. Thirty feet (30'). 2 5. Parking setbacks: a. Minimum front yard setback: Twenty feet (20'). b. Minimum rear yard setback: Ten feet (10'). c. Minimum side yard setback: Ten feet (10'). d. When there exists an easement for a shared private roadway or drive, the required setback is ten feet (10') from the easement. 6. Buffer yard: A buffer yard equal to thirty feet (30') or two (2) times the height of the building, whichever is greater, shall be required along any side or rear property line abutting any residential use. This area shall contain landscaping and berming to provide a ninety percent (90 %) opacity screen to a height of at least six feet (6') and shall not contain any structures, parking, off street loading or storage. Should landscaping and berming_be found ineffective by the city, the city maw approve screening walls and /or decorative fencing as an alternative. Screening walls shall be constructed of the same materials as the principal building and shall not extend more than twenty five feet (25') without a change in architecture to reduce their mass and appearance. 7. Maximum building height: Fifty feet (50'). G. Site and Building Standards: To prevent urban blight and ensure quality long lasting construction that does not detract from adjacent properties and is compatible with those throughout the district, all sites and buildings, except public parks, shall comply with the following standards, as well as applicable sections of this title: 1. Architectural Appearance: While variation in materials and colors that support the general theme may be allowed, the overall building should have "360 degree" architecture. Any variations shall focus the highest level of architectural detail, material variation, facade articulation, or roofline enhancements on those elevations that face a public right -of -way. Nonearth tone materials shall be limited to architectural accents. The color of the nonbrick or stone portion of the building shall match the predominant brick or stone color portion. a. Entry Features: Primary entrances facing a public right of way or abutting a required parking area shall be accented by visually pleasing entry features. This feature shall extend a minimum three hundred (300) square feet around a single entrance. Should the building have more than one entrance facing a public right of way or abutting a required parking area, this feature shall extend a minimum one hundred fifty (150) square feet around each individual entrance. 3 2. Building Massing: Facades shall be articulated to reduce their mass and scale and provide visual interest consistent with Rosemount's identity, character, and scale. Large uninterrupted building walls or elevations are prohibited. Corner architectural elements are encouraged to define the edges of a building. A building more than one hundred feet (100') in width shall be divided into increments of no more than thirty feet (30') through the articulation of the facade. This shall be achieved through combinations of the following techniques: a. Divisions or breaks in the materials. b. Arcades, entry features, window bays, or the like. c. Variations in rooflines or slope plane. d. Variation in building plane or setback. e. Equivalent techniques approved by the city. 3. Permitted Materials: The exterior wall surfaces of all buildings shall be constructed of at least fifty percent (50 %) brick or natural stone. The remaining fifty percent (50 %) of the wall surface may be specialty integral colored concrete block (including textured, burnished, and rock faced block), tile (masonry, stone or clay), architectural textured concrete panels cast in place, or better. EIFS or masonry stucco may be used for the -sign band arca3 and or architectural accents totaling no more than ten percent (10 %) of the non - glass, brick or stone portion of the building. Unadorned concrete is prohibited. 4. Pedestrian Circulation: Appropriate provisions shall be made to protect pedestrian areas from encroachments by parked or moving vehicles. Clear and well lighted walkways shall extend throughout the site and parking area(s) connecting building entrances to adjacent public sidewalks and any parking facilities located on the site. a. A walkway at least six feet (6') wide shall extend along any facade featuring a primary entrance and any facade abutting a parking or maneuvering area. b. A continuous and permanent barrier concrete curb not less than six inches (6 ") above grade shall separate internal sidewalks from parking, loading, stacking and maneuvering areas. 5. Lighting: Exterior lighting shall be consistent in character throughout the entire site. 4 a. Light shall be directed toward the ground. Externally lit signs, display, building and aesthetic lighting must be lit from the top and shine downward. Lighting must be shielded to prevent direct glare. b. The level of lighting shall not exceed 0.5 lumens at any residential use property line or 1.0 lumen at any nonresidential use property line, c. The maximum height for exterior lighting shall not exceed the following: 1. The maximum height for ball field lights is eighty (80) feet. The minimum setback for such lights shall be no less than the height of the light. 2. The maximum height for all other exterior lights is thirty (30) feet. The maximum height of such lights within one hundred (100) feet of a residential use or district shall be twenty feet (20'). d. All nonessential lighting will be required to be turned off after business hours, leaving only the necessary lighting for site security. 6. Parking Lots: To reduce the impact of large expanses of paved surfaces, provide a more pedestrian friendly environment and provide adequate room for snow storage, all parking areas (including driveways and drive aisles) shall be screened and landscaped. Trees, shrubs, flowers and ground cover needed in these areas shall be in addition to the minimum number of trees and foundation plantings required by this title. a. Screening: Landscaping and berming shall be a primary source for screening parking areas. Should landscaping and berming be found ineffective by the city, the city may approve screening walls and /or decorative fencing as an alternative. Screening walls shall be constructed of the same materials as the principal building and shall not extend more than twenty five feet (25') without a change in architecture to reduce their mass and appearance. The screening source (landscaping and berming or walls and /or decorative fencing) shall provide a minimum fifty percent (50 %) opacity screen to a height of at least four feet (4'). b. Landscaping: A minimum of ten percent (10 %) of the parking area shall be landscaped. This landscaping shall be located on islands, peninsulas or the like within the perimeter of the parking area. 1. The islands or peninsulas shall be a minimum eight and one -half feet (8.5') wide and extend the length of the adjacent parking stall(s). The City Council may 5 approve altered dimensions to insure sufficient area for the proposed landscaping to mature. 2. To ensure this landscaping is properly dispersed, a minimum of one island, peninsula or the like shall be located within each six thousand (6.000) square feet of vehicular use area. 3. A minimum of one tree shall be required for each two hundred fifty (250) square feet or fraction thereof, of required landscape area. Deciduous trees shall have a clear trunk of at least five feet (5') above the ground and a caliper of at least two and one -half inches (2.5 "). Coniferous trees shall be at least four feet (4') in height. The remaining area shall be landscaped with shrubs or ground cover (not to include rocks or gravel except as a mulch around shrubs and ground cover) not to exceed two feet (2') in height. 7. Landscaping: All areas of land other than those occupied by building or hardcover shall be landscaped with a combination of turf and plantings. Rock or mulch may only be used as an accent material around sod or plantings. Trees. shrubs, flowers and ground cover needed in these areas shall be in addition to the minimum number of trees and foundation plantings required by this title. ' . . - : :. - : , - - , - - . - .. . :. Portions of the site may be exempt from these requirements where future development or expansion is planned. These areas shall either be graded and seeded with prairie grass in accordance with the city of Rosemount grading requirements or remain as undisturbed natural areas containing existing viable natural vegetation that can be maintained free of foreign and noxious plant material and will not produce soil erosion due to potential increases in storm water runoff. Section 2. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and publication according to law. ENACTED AND ORDAINED into an Ordinance this 17th day of April 2012. CITY OF ROSEMOUNT William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk Published in the Rosemount Town Pages this day of 2012. 6 City of Rosemount Ordinance No. B- 220 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE B REVISING AND UPDATING THE RESIDENTIAL STANDARDS RELATING TO PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL USES THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT, MINNESOTA, ORDAINS that Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended as follows: Section 1. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -1: AG AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Agriculture, including accessory and related uses. 2. Commercial greenhouses and landscape nurseries. 3. Commercial livestock, furbearing animals, and fowl; dairy farming; and commercial horse stables provided: a. The site shall not be less than twenty (20) acres in size; b. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. 4. Essential service facilities. 5. Keeping of horses, provided: a. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. b. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of horses within the city contained in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 6. Single - family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. (Ord. B, 9-19 - 1989; amd. Ord. B -153, 4 -1 -2005) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Agricultural product stands. 1 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Gazebos and screened porches. 4. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 5. Private detached garages. 6. Private outdoor recreation, customarily associated with a residence. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Recreation vehicle storage, subject to section 8 -2 -5 of this code. 8. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 9. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B, 9 -19- 1989; amd. Ord. B -141, 7 -20 -2004) 10. Signs as regulated by Section 11 - 8. D. Conditional Uses: 1. AM radio antennas and supporting towers and related accessory structures. This use may be permitted only on properties situated in that part of the city north and east of State Trunk Highway 55. 2. Cement or concrete production provided the site has an approved mineral extraction permit in compliance with section 11 -10 -4, "Mineral Extraction ", and section 11 -10 -7, "Conditional Use Permits ", of this title. In addition to these sections, the performance standards outlined in subsection 11 -10 -4J of this title shall apply. 3. Commercial outdoor recreation. 4. Golf courses, including accessory and related uses. 5. Kennels, provided: a. The site shall not be less than twenty (20) acres in size. b. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. 2 c. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of animals within the city contained in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 6. Mineral extraction, provided the site is east of State Trunk Highway 52 on properties situated within one -half ( mile of County State Aid Highway 42. 7. Public parks owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 8. Transmission facilities greater than one -fourth ( mile in length. (Ord. B, 9 -19 -1989; amd. Ord. B -132, 8 -7 -2003; Ord. B -153, 4 -1 -2005) Section 2. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -2: AGP AGRICULTURAL PRESERVE DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Agriculture, including accessory and related uses. 2. Commercial livestock, furbearing animals, and fowl; dairy farming; and commercial horse stables provided: a. The site shall not be less than twenty (20) acres in size; b. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. c. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of horses within the city in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 3. Essential service facilities. 4. Keeping of horses, provided: a. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. b. The maximum number of horses shall not exceed one per two (2) acres. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of horses within the city in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 5. Single - family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12- 2 -1997; amd. Ord. B -153, 4 -1 -2005) 3 C. Accessory Uses: 1. Agricultural product stands. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Gazebos and screened porches. 4. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 5. Private detached garages. 6. Private outdoor recreation, customarily associated with a residence. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Recreation vehicle storage, subject to section 8 -2 -5 of this code. 8. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 9. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2 -1997; amd. Ord. B -141, 7 -20 -2004) 10. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. D. Conditional Uses: 1. Public parks, owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 2. Transmission facilities greater than one -fourth (1/4) mile in length. Section 3. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -3: RR — RURAL RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Commercial horse stables, provided: a. Lot is not less than twenty (20) acres; b. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. 4 c. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of horses within the city contained in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 2. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching substations. 3. Keeping of horses, provided: a. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. b. The maximum number of horses shall not exceed one per two (2) acres. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of horses within the city contained in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 4. Single- family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -153, 4 -1 -2005) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Construction office, temporary. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Gazebos and screened porches. 4. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 5. Private detached garages. 6. Private outdoor recreation, customarily associated with a residence. Swimming pools subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Recreation vehicle storage, subject to section 8 -2 -5 of this code. 8. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 9. Sales office, temporary. 10. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -141, 7 -20 -2004; Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2004) 5 11. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. D. Conditional Uses: 1. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation subject to the following restrictions: a. The property is designated "TR transitional residential" within the city's adopted comprehensive plan. b. The property must have direct access onto an arterial street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an arterial street. c. No ancillary uses, including, but not limited to, daycare, Montessori schools, and nurseries occurring separately from the religious service, are allowed at the church or place of worship. d. Site and building standards for a church or place of worship shall be greater than the surrounding residences to mitigate the greater scale and intensity of this use. Site and building standards in subsections 11- 4 -14G1 and G3 through G7 of this chapter shall apply. e. Landscaping standards for a church or place of worship shall be greater than the surrounding residences to mitigate the greater scale and intensity of this use and may require extensive boundary and foundation plantings to buffer the surrounding residences. The minimum landscaping requirement for churches and places of worship shall be the standards of the C -4 general commercial zoning district. f. The maximum lot coverage for churches and places of worship shall be thirty percent (30 %). 2. Commercial greenhouses and landscape nurseries. 3. Golf courses, including accessory and related uses. 4. Kennels, provided: a. The site shall not be less than twenty (20) acres in size. 6 b. All structures shall be located a minimum of seventy five feet (75') from all residential property lines. c. No outdoor keeping of animals or dog runs shall be permitted. d. Subject to the regulations regarding the care and keeping of animals within the city contained in title 7, chapter 4 of this code. 5. Public parks, owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational structures and facilities. 6. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2 -1997; amd. Ord. B -153, 4 -1 -2005; Ord. B -205, 4 -20 -2010) Section 4. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -5: R -1 LOW DENSITY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching stations. 2. Licensed child daycare for twelve (12) or fewer persons. Unlicensed child daycare shall comply with the requirements for customary home occupations in section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 3. Residential facilities, licensed by the state of Minnesota, serving six (6) or fewer persons. 4. Single- family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. (Ord. B, 9 -19 -1989) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Cemeteries, accessory to churches and or places of worship. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Construction office, temporary. 4. Gazebos and screened porches. 5. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 7 6. Private detached garages. 7. Private outdoor recreation customarily associated with an individual residence. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 8. Recreation vehicle storage, subject to section 8 -2 -5 of this code. 9. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 10. Sales office, temporary. 11. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord.B -141, 7 -20 -2004; Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2004) 12. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. D. Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the R -1 district and subject to the Minimum Lot Requirements and Setbacks in Section 11- 4 -18.F (except Minimum Lot Area). the Site and Building Standards in Section 11- 4 -18.G and the Conditional Use Permit standards in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Child daycares, Montessori wheels, aid or nursery facilities within a churches, places of worship, slid elementary and or 3ccondary educational institutions schools. 2. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation. Churches and place of worship must have direct access to or be within three hundred fcct (300') of a collector, minor arterial or principal arterial street. a. The property must have direct access onto an Arterial or Collector street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an Arterial or Collector street. 3. Elementary and Secondary educational institutions and facilities middle or special needs schools. 4. Golf courses. 5. Public parks, owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 8 6. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. 7. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. Section 5. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -6: R -1A LOW DENSITY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Peiiuitted Uses: 1. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching stations. 2. Licensed child daycare for twelve (12) or fewer persons. Unlicensed child daycare shall comply with the requirements for customary home occupations in section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 3. Residential facilities, licensed by the state of Minnesota, serving six (6) or fewer persons. 4. Single - family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Construction office, temporary. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Gazebos and screened porches. 4. Home occupations, subject to section 11 - - 16 of this title. 5. Private detached garages. 6. Private outdoor recreation customarily associated with a residence. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Recreation vehicle storage, subject to section 8 -2 -5 of this code. 8. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 9 9. Sales office, temporary. 10. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -141, 7 -20 -2004; Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2005) 11. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. E. Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the R -IA district and subject to the Minimum Lot Requirements and Setbacks in Section 11- 4 -18.F (except Minimum Lot Area). the Site and Building Standards in Section 11- 4 -18.G and the Conditional Use Permit standards in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Child daycares, Montessori wheels, and or nursery facilities within a churches, places of worship, awl elementary and or Sccondary educational institutions schools. 2. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation. Churches and place of minor arterial or principal arterial street. a. The property must have direct access onto an Arterial or Collector street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an Arterial or Collector street. 3. Elementary and Secondary educational institutions and facilities middle or special needs schools. 4. Public parks, owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 5. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. 6. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. Section 6. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -7: R -2 MODERATE DENSITY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching stations. 10 2. Licensed child daycare for twelve (12) or fewer persons. Unlicensed child daycare shall comply with the requirements for customary home occupations in section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 3. Residential facilities, licensed by the state of Minnesota, serving six (6) or fewer persons. 4. Single - family attached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -18 of this title. 5. Single- family detached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -15 of this title. 6. Two - family dwellings. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2 -1997) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Cemeteries accessory to churches and places of worship. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Construction office, temporary. 4. Gazebos and screened porches. 5. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 6. Private detached garages. 7. Private outdoor recreation customarily associated with a residence. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 8. Roomers, a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 9. Sales office, temporary. 10. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2004) 11. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. F. Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the R -2 district and subject to the Minimum Lot Requirements and Setbacks in Section 11- 4 -18.F (except Minimum Lot Area), the 11 Site and Building Standards in Section 11- 4 -18.G and the Conditional Use Permit standards in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Child daycares, Montessori wheels, trfiel or nursery facilities within a churches, places of worship, aftel cicmcnta_; afi or secondary educational institutions schools. 2. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation. Churches and place of worship must have direct access to or be within three hundred feet (300') of a collector, minor arterial or principal arterial street. a. The property must have direct access onto an Arterial or Collector street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an Arterial or Collector street. 3. Elementary and Secondary educational institutions and facilities middle or special needs schools. 4. Public parks, owned and operated by a government unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 5. Recreation vehicle storage. Recreation vehicle storage accessory to multiple - family development shall be subject to subsection 11 -4 -8D of this title. 6. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. 7. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. Section 7. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -8: R -3 MEDIUM DENSITY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: A. Permitted Uses: 1. Apartments. 2. Assisted living care facilities. 3. Condominiums. 4. Congregate housing. 12 5. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching stations. 6. Licensed child daycare for twelve (12) or fewer persons. Unlicensed child daycare shall comply with the requirements for customary home occupations in section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 7. Nursing and retirement homes. 8. Residential facilities, licensed by the state of Minnesota, for six (6) or fewer persons. 9. Single - family attached dwellings, subject to section 11 -2 -18 of this title. 10. Two - family dwellings. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2 -1997) B. Accessory Uses: 1. Cemeteries, accessory to churches and places of worship. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Construction office, temporary. 4. Gazebos and screened porches. 5. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 6. Private outdoor recreation, customarily associated with a multiple - family development, provided: a. They are no nearer the front lot line than the principal structure; b. They are set back from lot lines the distance required for accessory structures. c. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Roomers, at a maximum of two (2) per dwelling unit. 8. Sales office, temporary. 13 9. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2004) 10. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. G. Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the R -3 district and subject to the Minimum Lot Requirements and Setbacks in Section 11- 4 -18.F (except Minimum Lot Area), the Site and Building Standards in Section 11- 4 -18.G and the Conditional Use Permit standards in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Child daycares, Montessori seheols, aed or nursery facilities within a churches, places of worship, acid elerneitcarafitl or - - : : ; ; • .:: - . . : -.:: - schools. 2. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation. Churches and place of worship must have direct acccsa to or be within three hundred feet (300') of a collector, minor arterial or principal arterial street. a. The property must have direct access onto an Arterial or Collector street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an Arterial or Collector street. 3. Elementary and Secondary educational in3titution3 and facilities middle or special needs schools. 4. Public parks, owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area. 5. Recreation vehicle storage accessory to the multiple - family development, provided all storage shall be within a building or a central storage area, or be subject to the following requirements: a. Outdoor storage shall not be within a required yard; b. If not stored within a building, the storage area shall be screened from view as required by subsection 8 -2 -5G1 of this code. c. Temporary storage of oversize recreation vehicles is allowed pursuant to a permit under subsection 8 -2 -5F of this code. 14 6. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2 -1997; amd. Ord. B -141, 7 -20 -2004) 7. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council, subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. Section 8. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -4 -9: R -4 HIGH DENSITY RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT is hereby amended as follows: B. Permitted Uses: 1. Apartments. 2. Assisted living care facilities. 3. Condominiums. 4. Congregate housing. 5. Essential service facilities except electrical substations and switching stations. 6. Licensed child daycare for twelve (12) or fewer persons. 7. Nursing and retirement homes. 8. Residential facilities, licensed by the state of Minnesota, for six (6) or fewer persons. (Ord. B- 96, 12 -2 -1997) C. Accessory Uses: 1. Cemeteries accessory to churches and places of worship. 2. Community Gardens, provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP). Community Gardens are not permitted with residential uses. 3. Construction office, temporary. 4. Gazebos and screened porches. 5. Home occupations, subject to section 11 -2 -16 of this title. 15 6. Private outdoor recreation, customarily associated with a multiple - family development, provided: a. They are no nearer the front lot line than the principal structure; b. They are set back from lot lines the distance required for accessory structures. c. Swimming pools shall be subject to section 5 -3 -1 of this code. 7. Sales office, temporary. 8. Satellite dishes and solar collectors, subject to section 11 -2 -12 of this title. (Ord. B -96, 12 -2- 1997; amd. Ord. B -145, 11 -3 -2004) 9. Signs as regulated by Section 11 -8. H. Conditional Uses: The following uses are conditional uses in the R -4 district and subject to the Minimum Lot Requirements and Setbacks in Section 11- 4 -18.F (except Minimum Lot Area), the Site and Building Standards in Section 11- 4 -18.G and the Conditional Use Permit standards in Section 11 -10 -7. 1. Child daycares, Montessori settee's, and or nursery facilities within a churches, places of worship, a or Secondary educational institutions schools. 2. Churches and places of worship regardless of religious affiliation. Churches and place of worship must have direct access to or be within three hundred fcct (300') of a collector, minor arterial or principal arterial street. a. The property must have direct access onto an Arterial or Collector street or access to a local street within five hundred feet (500') of the local street's intersection with an Arterial or Collector street. 3. Elementary and Secondary educational institutions and facilities middle or special needs schools. 4. Public parks owned and operated by a government unit, including recreational facilities and structures. 5. Transmission facilities greater than one - fourth (1/4) mile in length. 16 6. Other uses similar to those listed in Section D as determined by the Board of Appeals and Adjustments and approved by the City Council. subject to issuance of a conditional use permit. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and publication according to law. ENACTED AND ORDAINED into an Ordinance this 17th day of April 2012. CITY OF ROSEMOUNT William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk Published in the Rosemount Town Pages this day of , 2012. 17 CITY OF ROSEMOUNT DAKOTA COUNTY, MINNESOTA RESOLUTION NO. 2012 - A RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING PUBLICATION OF ORDINANCE NO. B -219 AMENDING THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE B RELATING TO THE PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL DISTRICT AND ORINANCE B -220 AMENDING THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE B RELATING TO THE RESIDENTIAL DISTRICTS WHEREAS, the Planning Commission of the City of Rosemount recommended City Council approval of this amendment after holding a public hearing on February 28 and March 27, 2011; and WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Rosemount adopted Ordinance No. B -219 revising and updating Section 11 -4 -18, the P/I — Public and Institutional District relating to uses and performance standards; and WHEREAS, the City Council of the City of Rosemount adopted Ordinance No. B -220 revising and updating the Residential sections of the City Code relating to performance standards for public and institutional uses; and WHEREAS, Minnesota Statutes, Section 412.191, Subd. 4 allows publication by title and summary in the case of lengthy ordinances; and WHEREAS, the City Council finds that the following summary would clearly inform the public of the intent and effect of the Ordinances. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the Council of the City of Rosemount that the City Clerk shall cause the following summary of Ordinance No. B -219 and Ordinance No. B -220 to be published in the official newspaper in lieu of the entire ordinances: Public Notice During their April 17, 2012, meeting, the City Council of the City of Rosemount adopted Ordinance No. B -219 revising and updating Section 11 -4 -18, the P/I — Public and Institutional District related to uses and performance standards and Ordinance No. B -220 revising and updating the Residential sections of the City Code related to performance standards for public and institutional uses. In summary, the new ordinances make the following changes: Proposed Changes to the P/I — Public and Institutional District 1. Assign the following as permitted uses: college or universities; public or governmental services, including, city offices, public administration buildings and the like; public auditoriums, civic centers, community centers or the like; parks owned and operated by a governmental unit, including recreational facilities and structures consistent with the public area; and secondary schools. 2. Create an accessory use category including community gardens, fences, off -street parking, and signs to clarify additional activities allowed in the District. 3. Add an interim use section including temporary classrooms and the like. 4. Add specific development (setback, lot, height) standards. 5. Add specific site and building (architecture, building materials, pedestrian circulation, lighting, parking lot, and landscaping) standards. Proposed Changes to Residential Districts 1. Assign the following as conditional use: golf courses and elementary, special education (i.e. District 917 Alliance Education Center) and middle schools. 2. Both existing and new conditional uses would be subject to the P/I site and building (architectural appearance, building massing, permitted materials, pedestrian circulation, lighting, parking, and landscaping), buffer yards, lot, parking and building height standards. NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that copies of Ordinance No. B -219 and Ordinance No. B -220 shall be kept in the City Clerk's office at City Hall for public inspection and a full copy of the ordinance be posted in the lobby of City Hall for 30 days after adoption. ADOPTED this 17` day of April, 2012, by the City Council of the City of Rosemount. William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk City of Rosemount Ordinance No. B- 221 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE B RELATING TO SIGN STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC AND INSTITUTIONAL USES THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT, MINNESOTA, ORDAINS that Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended as follows: Section 1. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -8 -4: SIGNS GENERAL REGULATIONS is hereby amended as follows: E. Dynamic Signs: Dynamic signs are allowed subject to the following standards: 1. District Limitations: Dynamic signs may be located on properties within the C -3 highway commercial (excluding the downtown study area as designated in the development framework for downtown Rosemount), C -4 general commercial, and PI - Public and Institutional districts that also have frontage along an arterial road as designated in the comprehensive plan. Dynamic signs may also be located on public and institutional use within a residential zone. provided the site has an approved conditional use permit (CUP) and complies with all other sign standards. Section 2. Rosemount Zoning Ordinance B, Section 11 -8 -6: DISTRICT REGULATIONS is hereby amended as follows: B. Signs Allowed by Permit in Residential Districts: 1. Residential subdivisions having five (5) or more lots are allowed up to two (2) decorative freestanding monument signs per principal entrance to the subdivision. Each sign is limited to thirty two (32) square feet and six feet (6') in height. These signs shall be located on private property and shall not be located within any sight triangle. Such signs, if illuminated, shall use only indirect light with the light source fully diffused and aimed toward the ground. 2. Public or institutional U3CS or Apartment or condominium buildings are allowed one freestanding monument sign per site. Sites with multiple frontages along a public right of way will be allowed one additional sign per right of way frontage provided that the frontage faces another commercial or industrial nonresidential use or a collector or arterial road as identified in the comprehensive plan. Each sign is limited to thirty two (32) square feet and six feet (6') in height. These signs shall have a base made of 1 decorative materials compatible with the exterior materials of the principal structure on site. At a minimum, the base width dimension shall be larger than fifty percent (50 %) of the greatest width of the sign. Such signs, if illuminated, shall use only indirect light with the light source fully diffused and aimed toward the ground. These signs shall be located on private property and shall not be located within any sight triangle. 3. For sale or lease signs subject to the standards in subsection 11 -8 -3B7 of this chapter. 4. Public and Institutional uses may have signs subject to the standards in subsection 11-8 - 6.F of this chapter. Section 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and publication according to law. ENACTED AND ORDAINED into an Ordinance this 17` day of April, 2012. CITY OF ROSEMOUNT William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk Published in the Rosemount Town Pages this day of , 2012. 2 CITY OF ROSEMOUNT DAKOTA COUNTY, MINNESOTA RESOLUTION 2012 - A RESOLUTION APPROVING THE AMENDMENT TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REGUIDING SELECTED PUBLIC AND INSTUTIONAL PROPERTIES TO THE APPROPRIATE RESIDENTIAL CATEGORY WHEREAS, the Community Development Department of the City of Rosemount is requesting a Comprehensive Plan Amendment concerning property legally described below; and WHEREAS, on February 28, 2012, the Planning Commission of the City of Rosemount held a public hearing and reviewed the Comprehensive Plan amendment changing the land use for the following properties by reguiding them from P/I — Public and Institutional to LDR — Low Density Residential: Church of Our Savior PT OF S 747.55 FT OF E 310.24 FT OF W 445.24 FT OF SW 1/4 LYING N OF CEN DAK CO RD #42, Section 30, Township 115, Range 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. First Baptist Church PT S 1/2 OF NW 1/4 BEG SW COR E 736.18 FT N 208.70 FT W 30 FT N 48D47M36S W 183.73 FT N 190 FT N 19D46M 17S E 391.34 FT N 248.30 FT E 30.02 FT N 185.00 FT TO N LINE S 1/2 OF NW 1/4 W 729.12 FT TO NW COR SAID S 1/2 S ON W LINE 1321.52 FT TO BEG, Section 30, Township 115, Range 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. Rosemount Methodist Church PT OF LOT 13 COM 44.5 FT E & 150 FT S OF NW COR E 411.56 FT S 317.52 FT W 411.50 FT N 317.52 FT TO BEG EX BEG NW COR THIS PARCEL E 150 FT S 150 FT W 150 FT N 150 FT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 27, Dakota County, Minnesota. Lighthouse Church PT OF LOT 6 COM 1328.30 FT E & 408 FT N OF SW COR NW 1/4 29- 115 -19 N 300 FT W 290.4 FT S 300 FT E 290.4 FT ON N LINE JOHN ST EXT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 1, Dakota County, Minnesota. St. Joseph's Catholic Church PT OF W 1/2 OF SW 1/4 LYING S'LY OF LINE COM SW COR N 1006.13 FT TO BEG OF LINE S 68D56M20S E 154.28 FT E'LY ON TANG CUR CONC TO N RAD 882.0 FT C/A 44D04M24S 678.46 FT N 66D59M14S E 333.02 FT E'LY ON TANG CUR CONC TO S RAD 882.0 FT C/A 13D36M52S 209.58 FT TO E LINE OF W 1/2 OF SW 1/4 & THERE TERM, SECTION 21, TOWNSHIP 115, RANGE 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. RESOLUTION 2012 - Sh annon Park Elementary School LOT 1, BLOCK 1, SHANNON PARK SCHOOL ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. Rosemount Elementary School PT OF LOT 6 COM ON W LINE DODD RD 446 FT N & 19D 30M W 614.30 FT & 34.78 FT W OF CEN SEC NW & PARR WITH W LINE DODD RD 363.03 FT W 957.37 FT S 1226 FT E 8.37 FT S 33 FT E 307.5 FT S 20 FT E 87 FT N 793 FT E 613.35 FT N 55 FT E 131.72 FT TO BEG EX COM 60 FT W & 203 FT N OF SW COR LOT 8 N 112 FT E 385.63 FT TO W END JOHN ST N 60 FT W 414.63 FT S 225 FT E 8.37 FT N 53 FT E 20.63 FT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 1, Dakota County, Minnesota. Rosemount Middle School LOT 18, BLOCK 1, CONLEYS THOMAS T ADDITION TO ROSEMOUNT, Dakota County, Minnesota. Alliance Center PT OF NW 1/4 BEG 560 FT N OF SW COR E 715.13 FT N 653.63 FT TO S RW RR SW ON RW 843.71 FT S 234.92 FT W 33 FT S 122.2 FT TO BEG, SECTION 28, TOWNSHIP 115, RANGE 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. WHEREAS, on February 28, 2012, the Planning Commission of the City of Rosemount held a public hearing and reviewed the Comprehensive Plan amendment changing the land use for the following properties by reguiding them from P/I — Public and Institutional to NC — Neighborhood Commercial: CAP Agency PT OF OUTLOT A BEG NE COR W ON N LINE 221.92 FT S 443 FT E 207 FT S 200.30 FT TO S LINE E ON S LINE TO E LINE N TO BEG, UNIVERSITY ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. WHEREAS, on February 28, 2012, the Planning Commission of the City of Rosemount held a public hearing and reviewed the Comprehensive Plan amendment changing the land use for the following properties by reguiding them from P/I — Public and Institutional to MDR — Moderate Density Residential: Harmony Master Homeowners' Association LOT 1, BLOCK 1, HARMONY 4TH ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. WHEREAS, on February 28, 2012, the Planning Commission recommended that the City Council adopt an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan to change the land use designation for these properties as designated above; and WHEREAS, on March 20, 2012, the City Council of the City of Rosemount reviewed the Planning Commission's recommendations. 2 RESOLUTION 2012 - NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, the Council of the City of Rosemount hereby approves an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan to change the land use designation for the properties referenced above from P/I — Public and Institutional to the appropriate residential category as designated, subject to the following condition: 1. Approval of the Comprehensive Plan Amendment by the Metropolitan Council. ADOPTED this 17 day of April 2012, by the City Council of the City of Rosemount. William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk 3 City of Rosemount Ordinance No. B -222 AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE B CITY OF ROSEMOUNT ZONING ORDINANCE Selected Public and Institutional Uses THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ROSEMOUNT, MINNESOTA, ORDAINS AS FOLLOWS: Section 1. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to R1 - Low Density Residential: Shannon Park Elementary School LOT 1, BLOCK 1, SHANNON PARK SCHOOL ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. First Baptist Church PT S 1/2 OF NW 1/4 BEG SW COR E 736.18 FT N 208.70 FT W 30 FT N 48D47M36S W 183.73 FT N 190 FT N 19D46M 17S E 391.34 FT N 248.30 FT E 30.02 FT N 185.00 FT TO N LINE S 1/2 OF NW 1/4 W 729.12 FT TO NW COR SAID S 1/2 S ON W LINE 1321.52 FT TO BEG, Section 30, Township 115, Range 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. Church of Our Savior PT OF S 747.55 FT OF E 310.24 FT OF W 445.24 FT OF SW 1/4 LYING N OF CEN DAK CO RD #42, Section 30, Township 115, Range 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 2. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to RIA - Low Density Residential: Rosemount Elementary School PT OF LOT 6 COM ON W LINE DODD RD 446 FT N & 19D 30M W 614.30 FT & 34.78 FT W OF CEN SEC NW & PARR WITH W LINE DODD RD 363.03 FT W 957.37 FT S 1226 FT E 8.37 FT S 33 FT E 307.5 FT S 20 FT E 87 FT N 793 FT E 613.35 FT N 55 FT E 131.72 FT TO BEG EX COM 60 FT W & 203 FT N OF SW COR LOT 8 N 112 FT E 385.63 FT TO W END JOHN ST N 60 FT W 414.63 FT S 225 FT E 8.37 FT N 53 FT E 20.63 FT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 1, Dakota County, Minnesota. Rosemount Middle School LOT 18, BLOCK 1, CONLEYS THOMAS T ADDITION TO ROSEMOUNT, Dakota County, Minnesota. Rosemount Methodist Church PT OF LOT 13 COM 44.5 FT E & 150 FT S OF NW COR E 411.56 FT S 317.52 FT W 411.50 FT N 317.52 FT TO BEG EX BEG NW COR THIS PARCEL E 150 FT S 150 FT W 150 FT N 150 FT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 27, Dakota County, Minnesota. Lighthouse Church PT OF LOT 6 COM 1328.30 FT E & 408 FT N OF SW COR NW 1/4 29- 115 -19 N 300 FT W 290.4 FT S 300 FT E 290.4 FT ON N LINE JOHN ST EXT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 1, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 3. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to RR — Rural Residential: St. John's Lutheran Church PT OF SE 1/4 OF NE 1/4 BEG SE COR N ON E LINE 812.43 FT W 663.3 FT S 322.95 FT W 663.7 FT TO W LINE S 489. 5 FT TO SW COR E 1327.55 FT TO BEG, Section 26, Township 115, Range 19, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 4. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to C1 — Convenience Commercial: CAP Agency PT OF OUTLOT A BEG NE COR W ON N LINE 221.92 FT S 443 FT E 207 FT S 200.30 FT TO S LINE E ON S LINE TO E LINE N TO BEG, UNIVERSITY ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 5. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to AG — Agricultural: Rich Valley Golf Course W 1/2 OF NE 1/4 EX PARCEL 4 IN CTY R/W MAP 21, SECTION 30, TOWNSHIP 115, RANGE 18, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 6. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to R2 — Medium Density Residential: Harmony Master Homeowners' Association LOT 1, BLOCK 1, HARMONY 4TH ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 7. Ordinance B, adopted September 19, 1989, entitled "City of Rosemount Zoning Ordinance," is hereby amended to rezone the following properties from P/I — Public and Institutional to DT — Downtown Commercial: Dakota County Library LOT 2, BLOCK 1, KILCUMRERAGH ADDITION Dakota County, Minnesota. Steeple Center LOT 1, BLOCK 1, KILCUMRERAGH ADDITION, Dakota County, Minnesota. City Hall PT OF LOT 4 BEG 33 FT N & 359 FT E OF CEN SEC N 40 FT E 25 FT N 260 FT W 15 FT N 100 FT E 300 FT S 400 FT W 325 FT TO BEG, AUDITOR'S SUBDIVISION NO. 1, Dakota County, Minnesota. Section 8. The Zoning Map of the City of Rosemount, referred to and described in said Ordinance No. B as that certain map entitled "Zoning Map of the City of Rosemount," shall not be republished to show the aforesaid rezoning, but the Clerk shall appropriately mark the said zoning map on file in the Clerk's office for the purpose of indicating the rezoning hereinabove provided for in this Ordinance and all of the notation references and other information shown thereon are hereby incorporated by reference and made part of this Ordinance. Section 9. This ordinance shall be effective immediately upon its passage and publication according to law. ENACTED AND ORDAINED into an Ordinance this 17 day of April, 2012. CITY OF ROSEMOUNT William H. Droste, Mayor ATTEST: Amy Domeier, City Clerk Published in the Rosemount Town Pages this day of , 2012. STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A05- 1074 Court of Appeals Gildea, J. Took no part, Anderson, Paul. H., and Anderson, G. Barry, JJ. Wensmann Realty, Inc., et al., Appellants, vs. Filed: July 12, 2007 Office of Appellate Courts City of Eagan, Respondent. SYLLABUS A city does not lack a rational basis for declining to amend its comprehensive plan to permit residential development of golf course property, where retention of the existing land use designation preserves open and recreational space and reaffirms historical land use designations and where the proposed amendment raises concerns regarding traffic and school overcrowding. Under the circumstances presented in this case, a city's denial of an application to amend its comprehensive plan to permit residential development of golf course property constitutes a regulatory taking under the Minnesota Constitution if the denial leaves no reasonable use of the property. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc. OPINION GILDEA, Justice. Appellant Wensmann Realty, Inc., entered into a purchase agreement with appellant Rahn Family LP for golf course property located in respondent City of Eagan. The purchase agreement was contingent on the city amending its comprehensive plan to permit residential development of the property. After the city denied the proposed comprehensive plan amendment, Wensmann and Rahn (collectively, the property owner) commenced an action against the city, alleging that the denial was arbitrary and capricious and constituted a taking of the property without just cornper ion. On cross - motions for summa 'udgrnent, the district court granted declaratory relief and alternatively a writ of mandamus to the property owner. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment had rational bases and that the record did not support a taking. We conclude that the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment was not arbitrary or capricious and affirm on that issue, but we cannot decide the takings issue due to the presence of disputed fact issues. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' conclusion on the takings claim and remand to the district court for further proceedings. This land use dispute concerns 120 acres in Eagan, which have been known since the 1960s as the Carriage Hills Golf Course, a privately -owned eighteen -hole golf course that was open to the public. When the golf course was established, the area surrounding the property was largely rural. Since then, residential development has taken place on each side of the property except the north side, where Yankee Doodle Road borders the property. Currently, the land surrounding the property to the west, south, and east is designated for residential use, ranging from low to high density development. A school is located on the north side of the property . In 1996, the original owner of the golf course sold the property to Rahn for $3.6 million. At the time, the comprehensive plan designation for the property was "Public Facilities." Rahn bought the property shortly after the city denied a request to amend the comprehensive plan to permit residential development of the property. Rahn was aware of the city's action. Rahn had experience operating golf courses and intended to operate a golf course on the property. Rahn acknowledges that it had no intention at the time of purchase of selling the property for development purposes. In 1999, Rahn obtained a loan in excess of $3 million to pay off the contract for deed on the property and to pay for capital improvements to the golf course. Rahn asserts that the cost of the capital improvements at Carriage Hills "totaled well in excess of $300,000." But approximately $500,000 of the loan was used for a different golf course owned by Rahn. In 2000, Rahn and the city entered into an assessment agreement for sewer, water, and street improvements. The city assessed charges for three parcels of land, each representing a portion of the property, but for two of the parcels, the parties agreed to defer payments "until subdivision or development." The parties agree that the only payments Rahn has made under the assessment agreement have been related to its operation of the golf course on the property. At around the same time the assessment agreement was signed, a city engineer told Rahn that prov' ' lns were being made for future strr extensions near the golf course "to accommodate future development of the Carriage Hills property." When the city updated its comprehensive plan in 2001, the three golf courses in the city, including Carriage Hills were designated as "P" g g (Parks, Open Space and Recreation), a category that "provides areas for public and private parks, open space, and recreational facilities." According to the comprehensive plan, "[p] arks, trails, open space and natural areas, athletic complexes, ice arenas, and golf courses are examples of desired uses in this category." To achieve consistency with the comprehensive plan, the property was rezoned to "P" (Park), a zoning district "intended for public and private park uses and related facilities." The permitted uses in a park district include camping grounds, golf courses, parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, and tennis courts. The city has recognized Carriage Hills as a component of the city's parks and recreation system, which the city has described as a "public- private partnership." Although the golf course initially was profitable for Rahn, an economic downturn and an overbuilding of golf courses in the region have led to a more competitive industry. Rahn claims that the golf course has incurred significant cumulative losses amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars. The city contends, however, that when debt service on the 1999 loan is excluded, the golf course operated at a profit through 2002. The continuing losses led Rahn to conclude that the property was no longer economically sustainable as a [ 1 J golf course. Rahn agreed in 2003 to sell the property to Wensmann, a developer and builder of residential homes. The agreement was contingent on government authorities reclassifying and rezoning the property to permit residential development. In May 2004, Wensmann applied for an amendment to the city's comprehensive plan to allow residential development of the property. The application requested a land use designation of "Low Density Residential." Wensmann's proposal contemplated 480 housing units consisting of a mix of single - family homes, twin homes, townhomes, and empty nest housing. The proposed development would preserve 40 to 45 acres of park and open green space. In connection with the application, Wensmann presented the city with two feasibility studies of Carriage Hills prepared by golf course analysts McMurchie Golf Management, Inc., and Hughes & Company, Inc. The McMurchie analysis concluded that, as of July 2004, the property had a supportable purchase price of $967,000 as a golf course. The McMurchie analysis also concluded that the golf course would need a minimum of $516,000 in improvements to maintain operations. The Hughes analysis indicated that the golf course is "functionally obsolete and hi ignificant physical deterioration." ven if the course is improved over time," the Hughes analysis stated that "there is barely enough cash to upgrade and effectively no return to ownership for taking such a risk." The Hughes analysis concluded that "the financial feasibility of future operation as a golf course is seriously impaired." Wensmann's proposed development has faced substantial citizen opposition. An advisory planning commission recommended that the city deny the application. And in August 2004, the city council unanimously declined to amend the comprehensive plan to permit residential development of the property. In support of its decision, the city council made numerous findings and conclusions, including concerns about burdening an already overcrowded school system; disrupting neighborhoods in the area with a significant increase in traffic; balancing the amount of residential and other types of land use classifications within the city; and maintaining the integrity of the comprehensive plan. The city council also concluded that Wensmann "failed to produce sufficient evidence to indicate that the existing Comprehensive Guide Plan designation makes the Property not viable for use as a golf course." After the city denied the application and sometime in the fall of 2004 (the record does not disclose when), a representative of Wensmann made a multi - million dollar oral offer to Rahn to purchase the property with no conditions attached regarding the success or failure of the legal action or Wensmann's ability to pursue r2] residential development of the property. Rahn turned down the offer, but closed Carriage Hills at the end of the 2004 golf season. The golf course has not reopened. On September 1, 2004, Wensmann and Rahn entered into an option agreement, granting Wensmann the exclusive right to buy the property. The option expires in September 2007, and a provision in the agreement required Wensmann to commence litigation against the city to try to compel the city to grant the necessary permits and approvals to develop the property for residential use. Wensmann and Rahn commenced this action in Dakota County District Court. They sought declaratory relief that the city's denial of Wensmann's application for a comprehensive plan amendment is "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and effects a regulatory taking of the Property without just compensation." g Y g p Y � In the alternative, they petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing that the city commence eminent domain proceedings. The complaint alleged violations of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Based on the allegations of violation of federal law, the city removed the action to federal court. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the federal court dismissed the federal claims without prejudice and remanded the remaining state '.aims to the Dakota County Distric 'ourt. The federal claims have not been refiled. Thus, this action involves solely claims of violations of state law. In 2005, the district court considered cross - motions for summary judgment and granted declaratory relief and alternatively a writ of mandamus in favor of the property owner. The district court concluded that the city's reasons for denying the comprehensive plan amendment "are legally insufficient and are not supported by the facts in the record." The district court also concluded that "[o]perating a golf course on the property is no longer a reasonable use" of the property, and "none of the conditional or permitted uses currently allowed under the City Code would be reasonable uses." According to the district court, "if the City wants the property to remain as exclusively open space or a community recreational opportunity, it must acquire the property through eminent domain." Therefore, the district court ordered the city to "immediately amend" the comprehensive plan to change the land use designation for the property to Low Density and submit the amendment to the Metropolitan Council for approval. If the city did not comply with the order within 30 days, the city would be required to commence eminent domain proceedings. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, No. A05 -1074, 2006 WL 1390278, at *1 (Minn. App. May 23, 2006). The court of appeals concluded that the city had rational bases for denying the comprehensive plan amendment, and the property owner had no basis for a takings claim. Id. at *2 -4. We granted the property owner's petition for review on both the land use and takings issues. On appeal from summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Christensen v. Milbank Ins. Co., 658 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Minn. 2003). When the material facts are not in dispute, we review the lower court's application of the law de novo. Leamington Co. v. Nonprofits' Ins. Ass'n, 615 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 2000). Because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the property owner, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the city as the party against whom summary judgment was granted. See Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn. 2005). We also draw all factual inferences in favor of the city. See Meintsma v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc., 684 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Minn. 2004). 1. We turn first to the city's land use decision, and we review such decisions under a rational basis standard of review. Mendota Golf LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 179 (Minn. 2006). A decision regarding a proposed amend- nt to a city's comprehensive plan i - gislative in nature, see id., and the decision will be upheld unless the party challenging the decision can establish that there was no rational basis for the decision, Honn v. City of Coon Rapids, 313 N.W.2d 409, 414 -15 (Minn. 1981). "[E]xcept in those rare cases in which the city's decision has no rational basis, `it is the duty of the judiciary to exercise restraint and accord appropriate deference to civil authorities in the performance of their duties. ' Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417). Accordingly, our standard of review is very narrow. See, e.g., Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 72 (Minn. 1984). We review the record to determine if the reasons given by the city are legally sufficient and supported by a factual basis. Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 180; see also State ex rel. Howard v. Village of Roseville, 244 Minn. 343, 347, 70 N.W.2d 404, 407 (1955) ( "Even where the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is debatable, * * * it is not the function of the courts to interfere with the legislative discretion on such issues. "). We have observed that "a wide range of value judgments" are considered in the municipal planning process. Honn, 313 N.W.2d at 417. In this case, the city articulated several reasons for declining to amend the comprehensive plan, including preservation of open and recreational space and reaffirmation of historical land use designations. We recently upheld these reasons as rational bases supporting a city's land use decision that declined to alter a historical land use designation for property. See Mendota Golf, 708 N.W.2d at 181 -82. The property owner conceded at oral argument that these two reasons provide a rational basis for the city's decision here consistent with our analysis in Mendota Golf. We agree. In addition, the city cited the disruption of surrounding neighborhoods due to increased traffic and burdens on the school system. The property owner does not contend that concerns about traffic and school overcrowding cannot be a rational basis to support a land use decision. Instead, the property owner argues that there is not factual support for these concerns in the record. We disagree. Our review of the record demonstrates factual support for the city's traffic and school population concerns. Based on our review of the record and given the highly deferential standard of review, we conclude that the property owner has failed to establish that the city lacked a rational basis for its decision to deny J4] Wensmann's application or that the decision was not supported by an adequate factual basis. II. We turn next to the question of a taking. The property owner argues that even if the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment was supported by a rational basis, the denial nonetheless results in a regulatory taking under the Minnesot ',onstitution for which just coral: ;ation must be paid. Whether a governmental entity's action constitutes a taking is a question of law that we review de novo. Alevizos v. Metro. Airports Comm 'n, 298 Minn. 471, 484, 216 N.W.2d 651, 660 (1974). The Minnesota Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken, destroyed or damaged for public use without just compensation." Minn. Const. art. I, § 13. The language of the Takings Clause in the Minnesota Constitution is similar to the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Zeman v. City of Minneapolis, 552 N.W.2d 548, 551 -52 (Minn. 1996). We have therefore relied on cases interpreting the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause in interpreting this clause in the Minnesota Constitution. See, e.g., Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552 (citing federal cases). The purpose of the Takings Clause "is to ensure that the government does not require `some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. ' Westling v. County of Mille Lacs,581 N.W.2d 815, 823 (Minn. 1998) (quoting Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552). This is precisely what the property owner is arguing in this case —that the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment will preserve open space for the benefit of the entire community while forcing the property owner alone to bear the p economic burden. It is well established that the government need not directly appropriate or physically invade private property to effectuate a taking. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 -15 (1922); Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823. In limited circumstances, government regulation of property may result in a taking. The Supreme Court has observed that "government regulation —by definition— involves the adjustment of rights for the public good," and "[o]ften this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property." Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). In the context of government regulation a taking may result when the government "goes `too far' in its regulation, so as to unfairly diminish the value of the individual's property, thus causing the individual to bear the burden rightly borne by the public." Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823. But as the Supreme Court recently noted, "[t]he rub, of course, has been —and remains —how to discern how far is `too far.'" Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005). Determining where a regulation ends and a taking begins "calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic." Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65. Because the concepts of fairness and justice that underlie the Takings Clause "are less than fully determinate," the Supreme Court has "eschewed any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government." Palazzolo Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 6 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, "the determination of whether a taking has occurred is highly fact — specific, depending on the particular circumstances underlying each case." Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823; see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (describing takings analyses as "ad hoc, factual inquiries "). In Penn Central, the Supreme Court identified "several factors that have particular significance" in the takings analysis. 438 U.S. at 124. "Primary among those factors are `[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment — backed expectations.' In addition, the `character of the governmental action' * * * may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has occurred." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 -39 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). The Penn Central approach is flexible, with the factors often being balanced. E.g., Johnson v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Minn. 2003) (describing the Penn Central framework as a "balancing test "). But the primary focus of the inquiry is on "the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539. We have used the Penn Central framework in other cases to analyze takings claims arising under the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. See, e.g., Westling, 581 N.W.2d at 823 -24; Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552; Pratt v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 774 (Minn. 1981); State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 90 (Minn. 1979); Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 283 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1979). But see Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 115 (concluding that "even if appellants' takings claim under the United States Constitution fails under Penn Central, appellants are entitled to compensation under the Minnesota Constitution "). In this case, the property owner relies principally on the framework established in Penn Central to argue that a taking occurred, and the city does not contend that the Penn Central factors are not an appropriate framework in which to analyze the takings questions presented. Because the property owner is not asking us to interpret the Takings Clause in the Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the Takings Clause in the U.S. Constitution has been interpreted, we agree with the parties that the standards set forth in Penn Central provide the best analytic framework to determine whether the city's actions resulted in a regulatory taking under the [6] Minnesota Constitution. We turn now to this analysis. Economic Impact We look first at the economic impact of the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment. The inquiry under this factor "turn in large part, albeit not exclusively ion the magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests." Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540. Courts have employed "different methods of measuring economic impact, depending on the l� circumstances." CCA Assocs. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 170, 195 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The parties disagree about how to measure the economic impact in this case. The city argues that the economic impact should be measured by comparing the value of the property as a golf course before and after the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (explaining that courts should compare "the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property "). Because there is no evidence that the value of the property as a golf course has changed since the city denied the comprehensive plan amendment, the city argues that the denial had no economic impact on the property. The property owner, on the other hand, argues that the economic impact should be measured by comparing the value of the p Y p g property as a golf course with the value of the property if residential development had been permitted. According to the property owner, that comparison will measure the actual impact of the decision on the property's value. We conclude that neither of these methods is appropriate in this case. The city's proposed method is not well suited to measure the economic impact of the government's decision to maintain the status quo. We have recognized that such status quo decision - making can result in an unconstitutional taking. Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 536 -39, 253 N.W.2d 272, 273 -74 (1977). But under the city's proposed method, the government could effectively force a property owner to maintain an existing use of property forever by refusing to change the comprehensive plan designation, regardless of whether changed conditions have rendered the existing or permitted uses of the property obsolete and economically unviable. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 & n.36 (holding that there was no taking because the restrictions imposed by the city's landmarks law "permit reasonable beneficial use" of the Grand Central Terminal, but noting that even the city conceded that if the property owners "can demonstrate at some point in the future that the Terminal ceases to be `economically viable, "' the owners "may obtain relief'); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1191, 1197 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (recognizing that a refusal to rezone property may in limited circumstances deprive an owner of economic value in the property). Similarly, the property owner's method is not appropriate because it presupposes a right that the property never enjoyed under the city's regulatory scheme. A taking does not result simply because the property owner has been deprived of the m profitable use of the property. S 4ndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). If we measured the value of the property as if residential development had been permitted, whenever a city's zoning ordinance prevented a use of property that could be more productive or valuable than what is allowed, the property owner could try to assert a takings claim. See Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (explaining that a regulation may "have some adverse effect on the market value" of property without resulting in a taking). But "[t]he takings clause was never intended to compensate property owners for property rights they never had." Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865, 874 (Mass. 2005) We conclude that the most appropriate method in cases like this, where the government chooses to maintain an existing comprehensive plan designation, is to determine whether the city's decision leaves any reasonable, economically viable use of the property. A land use regulation that leaves no reasonable use of the property has an unduly severe impact on the legitimate interests of the property owner. We have applied this standard in other takings decisions involving zoning. See, e.g., Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 766 (Minn. 1982); Krahl, 283 N.W.2d at 543; Czech, 312 Minn. at 539, 253 N.W.2d at 274. A reasonable use standard — requiring that a land use regulation "afford an owner some reasonably beneficial and economically viable use of his land " —is also reflected in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, as well as "the vast majority of state court decisions." 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 6:22 (4th ed.) (citing cases); cf. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131 (noting that previous decisions have resolved takings claims "by focusing on the uses the regulations permit "). On this record, however, we cannot determine whether the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment leaves any reasonable use of the property. To begin with, it is disputed whether a golf course continues to be an economically viable use of the property. Rahn has closed Carriage Hills, claiming that "it cannot be operated profitably." But the McMurchie analysis concluded that the property had a supportable purchase price of $967,000 as a golf course. In addition, the parties disagree about whether debt service should be factored into the golf course's profitability analysis. The property owner asserts that the golf course has not earned a profit since 1999, but the city argues that when debt service for the 1999 loan is excluded, Carriage Hills was profitable during every year of Rahn's ownership except 2003. The Hughes analysis notes that the golf course operation is losing money "after paying debt service." Although this is a close question, we conclude that genuine issues of material fact prevent us from resolving whether a golf course continues to be a [ reasonable use of the nronertv. Even if we accept the prope. owner's contention that a golf cour is no longer a reasonable use of the property, we cannot determine on this record whether the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment leaves any other reasonable uses of the property. The property owner submitted affidavits wherein proffered expert witnesses opined that there was not a reasonable use left for the property other than residential development. Other than the argument regarding use as a golf course, which we have discussed above, the city does not specifically dispute these opinions or argue that the other permitted and conditional uses of the property under the comprehensive plan are reasonable uses for the property. Rather, the city argues that the property retains substantial value as investment property. See MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541, 547 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (suggesting that "[h]olding property for investment purposes can be a `use' of property" for purposes of deciding a takings claim). As evidence of the investment value of the property, the city cites Wensmann's multi- million dollar oral offer for the property, and argues that this offer demonstrates that the property is "anything but worthless." If we were to accept the oral offer as the true value of the property with the land use restrictions in place, not only can Rahn not show "serious financial loss," the figure represents a significant return on Rahn's investment in the property, and thus could support a finding that holding the property for its investment value is a reasonable use. See Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ( "What has evolved in the case law is a threshold requirement that plaintiffs show `serious financial loss' from the regulatory imposition in order to merit compensation. "); Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that property owner's takings claim was undermined by the fact that the property's value had almost tripled since the purchase, despite the challenged regulatory restraint). For example, in a case where wetlands property could no longer be used for mining limestone —the sole previous use by the property owner — the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that if a "solid and adequate fair market value" existed for the property, "that would be a sufficient remaining use of the property to forestall a determination that a taking had occurred." Fla. Rock, 791 F.2d at 903. The Federal Circuit explained that "economically viable use" does not necessarily mean "immediately viable use" if there is a willing buyer prepared to forgo instant income in hope of a long -term gain, such as a far– seeing investor willing to bet that the regulatory restraints would some day be lifted. Id.at 901 -03. The district court in this case refused to consider the "speculative value" of the property in view of the city's anticipated approval of residential development in the future. But, as the Federal Circuit noted in- Florida Rock, speculative value or usr Ire to be distinguished from "a rele- 't market made up of investors who are real but are speculating in whole or major part." Id. at 903. The Federal Circuit concluded there that the Claims Court had erred by not considering the possibility that the property owner "could have disposed of the property and mitigated the severity of the regulatory action." Id. The same inquiry needs to be conducted in this case. The property owner acknowledges that the oral offer was made. The parties dispute, however, the weight 1101 the offer should be given. The city argues that the offer represents "the amount that a willing buyer would pay for the property following the City's denial of the reguiding application," suggesting that the offer reflects the actual value of the property subject to the current comprehensive plan designation. But the property owner argues that it should be ignored because it is inconsistent with the terms of the parties' written agreement. According to the property owner, the true value of the property, in the absence of success in this litigation, is closer to $1 million taking into account the land use restrictions. The district court did not address the oral offer in its analysis of the takings claim, and the record is not fully developed on this point. The district court simply noted that the city had not challenged the property owner's evidence that "none of the conditional or permitted uses currently allowed under the City Code would be reasonable uses." Accordingly, we cannot determine the value of the property as investment property and thus whether holding or selling the property for investment purposes is a reasonable use. In sum, we cannot decide on this record whether the golf course remains a reasonable use of the property and whether there is another reasonable use under the current comprehensive plan designation. Therefore, we are unable to determine the economic impact of the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment. Investment- Backed Expectations The second Penn Central factor requires that we examine whether the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment has interfered with Rahn's "distinct investment - backed expectations." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. In examining a property owner's investment - backed expectations, the existing and permitted uses of the property when the land was acquired generally constitute the "primary expectation" of the landowner regarding the property. Id. at 136; see generally 1 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and Planning § 6:28 (4th ed.) (noting that the analysis "may distinguish between `legitimate' as opposed to `speculative' development expectations based on whether or not the regulation in question existed at the time the land was purchased by, or transferred to, the particular owner "). For example, in Zeman, we explained that ar wner who had used his property F 1 rental dwelling for 20 years had "some investment— backed expectations in its use as such." 552 N.W.2d at 553. In this case, when the property was acquired in 1996, Rahn had no expectation of using the property for anything other than a golf course and Rahn was aware that the city had recently refused to allow residential development of the property. Therefore, the city argues that Rahn had no reasonable investment - backed expectation regarding residential development. The fact that residential development of the property was prohibited when Rahn purchased the property is relevant to determining the reasonableness of Rahn's expectations, but Rahn's awareness of the restrictions does not automatically defeat the takings claim. The Supreme Court made this clear in Palazzolo, explaining that there is no per se rule that prohibits a Penn Central takings claim by the "mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the state - imposed restriction," 533 U.S. at 630; otherwise, "the postenactrent transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable." Id.at 627. Therefore, the court of appeals erred by suggesting that Rahn cannot assert a takings claim if it "'knew at the time of purchase that the property was subject to a zoning restriction. "' Wensmann, 2006 WL 1390278, at *3 (quoting Myron v. City of Plymouth, 562 N.W.2d 21, 23 -24 (Minn. App. 1997), cff'cc 1111 without opinion, 581 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. 1998)). Even though Rahn intended to use the subject property as a golf course at the time of purchase, the property owner asserts that Rahn's expectations subsequently changed when the golf course proved to be unprofitable. The property owner asserts that Rahn, like any other property owner, had a general expectation of making a reasonable rate of return on its investment. In addition, the property owner cites the assessment agreement with the city as supporting a reasonable expectation of developing the property. The property owner also stresses that permitting residential development of the property would be consistent with the residential nature of the surrounding property. We conclude that the investment- backed expectations factor favors the city. Rahn had no expectation of using the property at the time of purchase for anything other than a golf course, and the purchase price reflected the significant restrictions imposed on the use of the property. Furthermore, any losses that Rahn incurred subsequent to the purchase were not the result of the city's actions, but the result of general market conditions. As the United States Court of Federal Claims has observed, "Generally, when an owner buys property with knowledge of restrictions upon the development of that property, he assumes the risk of any economic loss." Atlas Enters. Ltd. P'ship v. U 'red States, 32 Fed. Cl. 704, 708 (F' Cl. 1995); see also Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994) ( "The takings clause.* * * does not charge the government with guaranteeing the profitability of every piece of land subject to its authority. "). Rahn may have expected to earn a reasonable rate of return on its investment, but the Penn Central inquiry focuses on distinct investment- backed expectations. 438 U.S. at 124. In other words, the property owner must actually have invested money in connection with its reasonable expectations regarding the proposed use of the property. Merely having expectations that the property might someday be developed as residential property without taking investment action on such expectations is not relevant to the Penn Central analysis, even if the expectations are reasonable. In this case, although the city did give Rahn some indications that residential development would be allowed at some point in the future and Rahn's expectations in that regard may therefore have been reasonable, Rahn is unable to demonstrate that it made any specific investment in the property with the expectation that the city would support such development. For example, Rahn concedes that it did not make any payments under the assessment agreement other than what was required for operation of the golf course. The investment - backed expectation factor therefore favors the city. Character of the Governmental Action 1 The last Penn Central factor focuses on the character of the government action. For years, courts looked at whether a zoning ordinance substantially advanced "legitimate state interests" in determining whether a taking occurred. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (noting that a number of the Court's "takings precedents have recited the `substantially advances' formula minted in Agins"). But the Supreme Court recently clarified that the underlying validity of a regulation is more of a due process question and "is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking." Lingle, 543 U.S. at 543. We believe that the appropriate focus of the character inquiry should be on "the nature rather than the merit of the governmental action." Small Prop. Owners of San Francisco v. City & County of San Francisco, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 121, 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). Although the relevant considerations may vary depending on the circumstances of the case, an important consideration involves whether the regulation is general in application or whether the burden of the regulation falls disproportionately on relatively few property owners. See CCA Assocs., 75 Fed. Cl. at 188. In Lingle, the Court explained that any takings test should take into account the actual burden imposed on property rights and "how that burden is allocated." 544 U.S. at 543 (emphasis added). Considering the allo' "ion of the burden also corresponds "h the emphasis on fairness that has [13] informed our takings jurisprudence. See Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 552. For example, in Johnson v. City 01 Minneapolis, we concluded that acting in bad faith and specifically targeting certain properties constituted a taking under the Minnesota Constitution. 667 N.W.2d at 116. The property owner in this case asserts that by refusing to allow development of the property, the city has placed an extreme burden on one property owner while benefiting the public as a whole with open space for which the city did not pay. While the city focuses on the fact that the restrictions on the property were designed in aid of a comprehensive plan, the property owner focuses on the limited uses allowed under the "Park, Open Space and Recreation" comprehensive plan designation. According to the property owner's land use expert, the language used in the city's comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance is typical of language used "to describe public parks and publicly —owned uses, not private business uses." Moreover, according to this expert, it is not typical for a city to exclude other commercial, industrial, or residential uses and identify park and recreation uses as the only uses allowed in zoning districts that govern privately owned land. The city's "Park System Plans have consistently recognized Carriage Hills, a privately owned, open -to- the- public golf course, as a component of the community's parks and recreation system." According to the city, the "Park System Plans have always acknowledged the need for golf courses as part of the overall recreation system," and the 2001 comprehensive plan contemplates that the city may "acquire land, if feasible, for parks." Nonetheless, when Carriage Hills experienced financial difficulties, the city declined to buy the property from Rahn and has refused to allow the property owner to pursue other uses of the property. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the character factor favors the property owner. This is not a situation where numerous property owners are subject to the same kind of land use restrictions, and a single property owner is asking the city to allow a new, different use. Instead, it appears that only a few private property owners in the city are subject to the "Parks, Open Space and Recreation" land use designation. The land use designation is extremely restrictive, and seems aimed at things that have been considered governmental functions. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 429.021, subd. 1(6) (2006) (granting the council of a municipality the power to "acquire, improve and equip parks, open space areas, playgrounds, and recreational facilities within or without the corporate limits "); Minn. Stat. §§ 473.301 —.351 (2006) (addressing the need to preserve, protect, and develop recreational open space areas in the metropolitan area and authorizing the Metropolitan Council to make grants to acquire or develop such areas). Moreover, the property owner here merely is asking the city to allow the same type of residential r' - elopment that the city has approve ' '1 the past for neighboring property owners. One of the reasons there is apparently a greater need for open space in the area of the property now is because the city has permitted other open space surrounding the golf course to be developed. On these facts, we conclude that the burden of the comprehensive plan designation falls disproportionately on the property owner. The benefits of the open space provided by the golf course property are widely shared through the community, but the costs are focused solely on the property owner. We have trouble discerning any reciprocity of advantage resulting from the comprehensive plan designation for the property. Cf. Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that "[w]hen there is reciprocity of advantage, paradigmatically in a zoning case, then the claim that the Government has taken private property has little force" (internal citation omitted)). Therefore, we resolve the character factor 1141 against the city. Balancing of Factors The final step of our takings analysis involves balancing the Penn Central factors. How the balance is struck will be driven by the facts of each particular case. In this case, having considered the economic impact of the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment, Rahn's investment - backed expectations, and the character of the government action, we conclude that the determinative factor in this case is whether the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment leaves the property owner with any reasonable use of the property. Even though , Rahn cannot demonstrate that it had any reasonable investment - backed expectations in the residential development of the property, if a golf course is no longer an economically viable use of the property and the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment leaves no other reasonable use of the property, the city's refusal to change the comprehensive plan designation places a substantial, uncompensated burden on a single property owner. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (noting that the "touchstone" of the regulatory takings analysis is "the severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property rights. "). The citizens of Eagan clearly value the open space that the golf course provides, but if the property owner is forced to leave the property undeveloped for the benefit of neighboring landowners without an opportunity to pursue a reasonable use of the property, the city is, in essence, asking the property owner to carry a burden that in all fairness should be borne by the entire community. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Although the ultimate determination of whether the facts are sufficient to constitute a taking is a question of law, we cannot determine on this record, as discussed above, whether the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment leaves the p' erty owner with any reasonable use the property. Specifically, there is a factual dispute as to whether continued use of the property as a golf course is reasonable and whether holding or selling the property for investment purposes is a reasonable use. Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' conclusion on the takings issue and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. ANDERSON, Paul H., J., and ANDERSON, G. Barry, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. w In 2001, Rahn offered to sell the property to the city, but the city declined. u The exact dollar amount of the offer is in the record but is part of material the district court ordered to be held confidential. Accordingly, we do not include it in this opinion. We do note, however, that the amount of the offer was millions of dollars less than the amount Wensmann agreed to pay for the property in the 2003 written purchase agreement. The purchase price amount was also sealed by the district court. 131 With regard to traffic, the city's planning report concluded that the proposed development could generate over 3,000 additional trips, much of it impacting traffic at Lexington Avenue and Yankee Doodle Road, located at the northwest corner of the property. Moreover, Wensmann and Rahn commissioned their own traffic study, which concluded that if 65% of the proposed site is developed according to Wensmann's plan, the increase in traffic will warrant a new traffic signal at Yankee Doodle Road and Wescott Woodlands, located at the northeast corner of the property. With regard to the school population, the city's planning report noted that the middle school and high school currently exceed capacity and are anticipated to do so for the next five years, and the estimated additional students from the proposed development would "add to the existing school capacity situation." [4] The property owner also cites "substantial change to the neighborhood" and asks us to hold that the city's decision was invalid under Sun Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, 300 Minn. 326, 220 N.W.2d 256 (1974). As we noted in Mendota Golf, however, Sun Oil does not articulate a standard of judicial review different from the rational basis standard we apply here. 708 N.W.2d at 180 n.11 (discussing Sun Oil). We did discuss in Sun Oil whether the village's decision left the property owner with any "reasonable use" for its property. 300 Minn. at 337, 220 N.W.2d at 263. We apply that same analysis in this case in connection with our examination of the takings question. Lit We have observed, however, that the language of the Takings Clause of the Minnesota Constitution can be construed to provide broader protections than the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See State by Humphrey v. Strom, 493 N.W.2d 554, 558 (Minn. 1992). But the property owner does not contend that this case requires us to interpret the Minnesota Constitution more broadly than the U.S. Constitution. 1 6 I The property owner also has suggested that the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment constitutes a categorical taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). In Lucas, the Supreme Court stated that "when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the r9me of the common good, that is, to 'Pave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking." Id. at 101. The focus on the deprivation of "a.. .conomically beneficial uses" of the property in categorical takings claims under Lucas is confusingly similar to the focus on the denial of "economically viable use[s]" of the property that often takes place in regulatory takings claims under Penn Central. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that in categorical takings claims, the deprivation of all economically beneficial uses means "a complete elimination of value." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 -20 n.8. In other words, a property owner must demonstrate that a regulatory action resulted in ''a 100% diminution in value." Norman v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 252 (Fed. Cl. 2004), aff'd, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2288 (2006); see also Tahoe– Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) (explaining that "the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100 %" and anything less than a total loss "would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central"); Johnson, 667 N.W.2d at 114 (stating that for claims arising under the U.S. Constitution, "[a]nything less than a complete taking of property requires the balancing test set forth in Penn Central "); Zeman, 552 N.W.2d at 553 n.4 ( "The trial court correctly observed that, if an alternative use is available, even if it is not the best or most profitable use, the regulation has caused merely a decline in the property's value, not the denial of all economically beneficial use; as the trial court noted, a decline in value is insufficient to bring this case within the ambit of Lucas. "). In this case, the financial analysis offered by the property owner demonstrates that the property's value has not been completely eliminated; rather, the McMurchie analysis concluded that the property had a value of close to $1 million as a golf course. Therefore, the denial of the comprehensive plan amendment does not constitute a categorical taking under Lucas. F71 The United States Court of Federal Claims has described three different methods that courts have used in measuring the economic impact of a regulatory action: One method measures the value taken from the property by regulatory action against the overall initial value. A second measure looks to the claimant's ability to recoup its capital. The third method examines a claimant's return on equity under a given regulatory regime in comparison to the return on equity that would be received but for the alleged taking. CCA Assocs., 75 Fed. Cl. at 195 (citations omitted). u In the summary judgment order, the district court concluded that "rezoning the subject property LD —Low Density, is the most reasonable zoning classification for the property." (Emphasis added.) Although we are uncertain whether the district court applied this analysis to the city's land use decision or the takings analysis, the correct test in the takings context is not whether the city allows the most reasonable use of the property, but whether there is any reasonable use left. See Almquist v. Town ofMarshan, 308 Minn. 52, 69, 245 N.W.2d 819, 828 (1976) ( "It is too fundamental for citation of authorities that rezoning, which is otherwise valid, does not give rise to an action for damages because the land in question may be more valuable for some other purpose. "). [91 The city argues that these affidavits are not admissible because they were not before the city council when it denied Wensmann's application. But we are not considering the affidavits in our review of the city's land use decision. The affidavits were before the district court on summary judgment and therefore are properly part of the record before us in connection with our review of the takings question. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (describing record on summary judgment). [101 The property owner argues that we should not give the oral offer any weight because the statute of frauds prohibits the enforcement of oral contracts for the sale of real property. See Minn. Stat. § 513.05 (2006). Here, evidence of the offer is not being used to prove the existence of a contract, but only to show that an oral offer was made. The proper weight to be given to the oral offer is an issue that is best addressed by the district court in the first instance on remand. [11] To the extent that Myron c .d be read to require the automatic _ action of a takings claim where the property owner knew at the time of purchase that the property was subject to a zoning restriction, it is overruled. [1 The character factor has been described as "the most confused and confusing feature of regulatory takings doctrine." John D. Echeverria, The "Character" Factor in Regulatory Takings Analysis, SK081 ALI- ABA 143, 145 (2005). [131 In examining the character factor in Zeman, we emphasized the purpose of the regulation, concluding that there was no taking where the city ordinance served "a public harm prevention purpose " — deterring criminal activity in residential neighborhoods —and the ordinance was likely to achieve that purpose. 552 N.W.2d at 554- 55. We recognize that this type of focus on the purpose of the regulation in Zeman and other cases has been called into question by Lingle. Of course, a regulation still may be susceptible to a due process challenge if the regulation fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective. That question is not before us. [141 In McShane v. City of Faribault, we observed that "not all zoning regulations are comparable." 292 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. 1980). We distinguished between zoning regulations that arbitrate among competing land uses and zoning regulations that benefit a specific governmental enterprise. Id. at 257 -59 (explaining that zoning regulations designed to effect a comprehensive plan generally involve "a reciprocal benefit and burden accruing to all landowners," while zoning regulations "for the sole benefit of a governmental enterprise" generally result in the burden falling on just a few individuals). But see Pratt v. State Dep't of Natural Res., 309 N.W.2d 767, 773, 774 (Minn. 1981) (noting that "the line between `enterprise' and `arbitration' is not always easy to discern" because of "[t]he presence of multiple purposes" for most regulations). Some commentators have viewed the McShane analysis as a distinct Minnesota approach to takings claims. See, e.g., 25 James R. Dorsey, Bradley J. Gunn & Marc D. Simpson, Minnesota Practice Real Estate Law § 10.37 (Eileen M. Roberts ed., 2007) (commenting on the multitude of "not entirely consistent" standards used by Minnesota courts for determining the existence of a regulatory taking); Arthur G. Boylan, Case Note, Property— Losing Clarity in Loss of Access Cases: The Minnesota Supreme Court's Muddled Analysis in Dale Properties, LLC v. State, 29 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 695, 708 (2002) (characterizing the "governmental enterprise" rule exemplified in McShane as "a different approach" to takings). In this case, the district court concluded that the city's denial of the comprehensive plan amendment, "in addition to being a taking under the Penn Central test, is also a taking under McShane." We do not view the McShane analysis as different from or inconsistent with the flexible approach to takings adopted by the Supreme Court in Penn Central. Any unfairly unequal distribution of the regulatory burden may be considered in appropriate cases under the character factor of the Penn Central approach and then balanced along with the other relevant factors. See Pratt, 309 N.W.2d at 774 (stating that "the principles enunciated in McShane for determining whether a taking has occurred must be applied with some flexibility" and noting that in Penn Central the Supreme Court "characterize[d] the inquiry as an essentially act hoc examination of many significant factors "). e MIHNE$OTA I ournals1 tom REAL ESTATE JOURNAL VOLUME 24, NUMBER 6 ©2008 Law Bulletin Publishing Co. June 2008 ** *pit To get deals done think smaller and closer to home Minnesota Supreme Court The Wensmann decision, however, recognizes that the costs answered the question left open in the of providing open space Mendota Golf case: namely, whether the to benefit the public failure to amend the Comprehensive Plan can result in a valid regulatory tak- should not be borne by a ings claim. single landowner _ The Wensmann Court first noted that "the purpose of the Takings Clause is to I n a ruling issued on July 12, 2007 in ensure that the government dots not Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of require some people alone to bear pub - Eagan, the Minnesota Supreme Court • - ' Iic burdens which, in all fairness and jus- held that a City's refusal to change a _ tice, should be borne by the public as a comprehensive plan designation to per whole" The Court also noted that the ,< h ri mit residential development of a former t � g overnment need not physically ' sicall y take p `- golf course may give rise to a valid claim vate property to effectuate a constitu- that private property has been taken for tional taking and that regulation alone public use without just compensation. may constitute a taking. The Court then The Wensmann case involved the 120- answered the question of when a regu- acre Carriage Hills Golf Course in Kelly Doran lation goes so far as to constitute a tak- Eagan. Eagan's comprehensive plan des- ing under Minnesota law: A taking ignated the golf course as P (Parks, Open 2005, and the property is cur•ently occurs when the City's regulation leaves Space and Recreation). The current no other reasonable, economically vacant. viable use of the property. owner, Rahn Family LP, bought the Wensmann and Rahn brought suit p p y' property in 1996 intending to continue The Minnesota Supreme Court against the City of Eagan requesting a operating it as a golf course. Despite sev writ of mandamus to compel the City to remanded the case to the trial court for eral upgrades and investments, Carriage amend its Comprehensive Plan to allow further hearings to determine the factual question of "whether the city's Hills began losing several hundred thou- residential development on the golf q y's decision sand dollars each season. Because of its leaves any reasonable, economically age and small size, Carriage Hills was course. Wensmann and Rahn also viable use of the property." if the City's requested that the Court determine that unable to compete with the multitude of the failure to amend the Comprehensive refusal to change the land use designa- newer, longer golf courses throughout Plan constituted a regulatory taking of Iron does not leave any reasonable, eco- the metropolitan area. Rahn granted nomically viable use of the property, a private property in violation of the Fifth Wensmann Realty, a residential Bevel- Amendment to the United States and taking has occurred, and the City would oper, an option to buy Carriage Hills. Minnesota State Constitutions. need to pay Rahn the value of the land. Wensmann asked the City to re-guide The Minnesota Supreme Court, rely- The Minnesota Supreme Court also the property to allow residential devel ing upon its decision a year earlier in recognized binding U.S. Supreme Court opment, based on studies that the golf Mendota Golf, LLP v. The City of Men- precedent that an owner like Rahn, who course could not be operated at a profit. dota Heights, first held that the City purchases land with knowledge of zon Under intense pressure from neighbors upholding the existing land use designa ing restrictions, is not prohibited there - that favored the continued use of the after from making a regulatory takings tion, and protecting open space consti- property as a golf course, the City tuted valid reasons to refuse to amend claim. The Court expressly overruled refused to reguide the property. Rahn the Comprehensive Plan to allow resi previous Minnesota case law to the con - eventually shut down the golf course in dcntial development on the property. traty. After the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision, The Eagan City Council on March 18, 2008 approved a contingent settlement that will allow Eagan voters to decide whether to purchase the Car- riage Hills Golf Course or to allow the land to be developed for residential homes. If Eagan residents vote this November to maintain the as open space, the City will pay $10 million for the 120 -acre site, plus other expenses. Even before the November election, Eagan will start the review process for homes that could be built if voters decide not to purchase the property. The City reserved the right to approve or deny the development proposal, but doing so would likely result in continuing litiga- tion. Cities are now on notice that their land use decisions must allow landowners to make reasonable use of their property. Cities cannot require individual landowners to bear the full, uncompen- sated burden of providing unprofitable open space for the benefit of other city residents. Joseph Springer is a shareholder in the Minneapolis Icnv firm ofFredrikson & Byron, P.A. DATE: April 21, 2010 FROM: Charlie LeFevere, City Attoney TO: Jason Lindahl, City Planner RE: Public and Institutional District Zoning Text Amendment The city has under consideration changing the guide plan and zoning code for properties zoned "P" (Public and Institutional). This is, at least in part, a reaction to cases in other area cities challenging similar land use regulations. In the past few years, there have been at least two cases involving requests to reguide golf courses to residential uses. In the case of Wensmann Realty v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623 (Minn. 2007), a golf course was guided "P" (Park Open Space and Recreation). In the case of Mendota Golf LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162 (Minn. 2006), the guide plan classified the golf course as "GC" (Golf Course). In both cases, the landowner requested that the comprehensive plan be changed to low density residential. When the cities denied the applications, the landowners appealed. In both cases, the landowners challenged the denial on the ground that the decision of the city was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. In both cases, the court decided that the decision to deny the requested guide plan amendment was not arbitrary. However, in both cases, a second question was left unresolved due to the procedural status of the cases at the time they carne to the court. The question that was left for further possible court proceedings was whether the refusal to reguide the property, although a rational and defensible land use decision, was nevertheless a regulatory taking. A land use control can be lawful and defensible, but if the effect of the regulation is the taking of property without compensation, the government may be required to amend its land use control, or compensate the landowner for the property taken. Whether any regulation constitutes an unconstitutional regulatory taking is not always easy to determine. The question is essentially whether the landowner is left with a reasonable use of the affected property. All land use regulations should have a lawful and reasonable purpose, and any land use regulation could constitute a regulatory taking if the effect of the regulation is to deprive a landowner of all reasonable use. This issue is not unique to "public" or "public and institutional" zoning. However, it does seem likely that public or institutional zoning is more likely to result in a challenge than more common residential, commercial, or industrial land use designations because of the limited number of uses to which the property can be put in public and institutional zones. The park or park and recreational land use designation of the golf courses in both the Eagan and Mendota Heights cases was sustained as a reasonable land use regulation. However, it would be advisable to be mindful of the regulatory taking issue, particularly in the case of privately owned property that is zoned for these kinds of quasi -public uses. There is probably less reason to reguide or rezone publicly owned property in many cases. If the city intends to keep city hall at its current location, or if public land zoned for park purposes is expected to be kept as a city park for an indefinite period of time, I see no reason why the city should go through an effort to find some other land use designation for the property. On the other hand, if there is a reasonable possibility that property that is currently zoned for public and institutional uses may be put to some different land use in the future, it may be a good idea to plan for that alternate land use at this tune. Let me know if you have any further questions on this. Charlie Charles L. LeFevere Kennedy and Graven, Chartered 470 U. S. 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